Takings Localism by Davisdson, Nestor M. & Mulvaney, Timothy M.
Texas A&M University School of Law 




Nestor M. Davisdson 
Fordham Law School, ndavidson@law.fordham.edu 
Timothy M. Mulvaney 
Texas A&M University School of Law, tmulvaney@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Land Use Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the State and 
Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nestor M. Davisdson & Timothy M. Mulvaney, Takings Localism, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2021). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1467 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 




Nestor M. Davidson* & Timothy M. Mulvaney** 
Conflicts over “sanctuary” cities, minimum wage laws, and gender-
neutral bathrooms have brought the problematic landscape of contemporary 
state preemption of local governance to national attention. This Article 
contends that more covert, although equally robust, state interference can 
be found in property, with significant consequences for our under-
standing of takings law. 
Takings jurisprudence looks to the states to mediate most tensions 
between individual property rights and community needs, as the takings 
federalism literature recognizes. Takings challenges, however, often involve 
local governments. If the doctrine privileges the democratic process to 
resolve most takings claims, then, that critical process is a largely local one. 
Despite the centrality of local democracy to takings, state legislatures 
have restricted local authority on property issues in a range of ways. 
States have expanded compensatory liability for owners facing local 
regulations, imposed procedural constraints on local authority, and 
limited the exercise of foundational local powers. Seen in its entirety, this 
state intervention—like contemporary “new preemption”—is acontextual 
and unduly rigid, cutting at the heart of the devolutionary principles 
underlying takings jurisprudence. 
This unbalanced state role requires a recalibration of decisionmaking 
power between state and local government to foster intersystemic dialogue 
and reflection. States certainly play a crucial role in defining and pro-
tecting property interests, but they must justify choices to constrain local 
discretion when state and local values conflict. The extant state statutory 
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regime dispenses with this justificatory task via a formalistic disregard 
for the contextualization that legitimates vertical allocations of authority. 
A corrective to decades of imbalance in state ordering of local authority 
would thus properly recognize “takings localism.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Takings jurisprudence defines when just compensation to those 
impacted by changes in property law is constitutionally required.1 The case 
law, by and large, leaves many challenging questions of the balance 
between individual property rights and community imperatives to be 
resolved through the democratic process within the states. This doctrinal 
reality has generated a growing debate on takings federalism. Some 
scholars decry the lack of national uniformity and the seeming absence of 
robust protection for property that this devolution entails.2 Others, by 
contrast, underscore the value of evaluating property transitions with 
greater regard for the states’ traditional centrality in defining property 
interests.3 
This debate obscures the fact that the conflicts that give rise to takings 
claims far more often than not are local in nature.4 Indeed, many iconic 
takings cases involve local governments.5 This is true in discerning the 
boundaries of public use for eminent domain,6 in evaluating the 
                                                                                                                           
 1. The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution states: “[N]or shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 2. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, What’s Federalism Got to Do with Regulatory 
Takings?, 8 Brigham-Kanner Prop. Rts. Conf. J. 9, 9–14 (2019) [hereinafter Berger, What’s 
Federalism] (arguing for a “system of uniformly applied standards” to ensure a “federal 
baseline of constitutional protection” from state and local regulations restricting the uses of 
property); Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. Chi. Legal Forum 53, 71–
76 [hereinafter Somin, Federalism and Property Rights] (arguing that “rational political 
ignorance and irrationality” influence local land-use policy by reducing the quality of 
government decisionmaking and the ability to monitor abuses). 
 3. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings 
Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L.J. 203, 205–06 (2004) [hereinafter Sterk, Federalist Dimension] 
(positing that the Supreme Court need not use its takings jurisprudence to articulate a 
comprehensive theory of regulatory power because any constitutional takings standard must 
incorporate the background principles of each individual state’s property laws). 
 4. See infra section I.B. 
 5. Notable takings cases have certainly involved the states. See, e.g., Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 709–11 (2010) (Florida beach 
restoration program); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 533 (2005) (Hawaii 
commercial rent control); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614–15 (2001) (Rhode 
Island Coastal Resources Management Council decision); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1007–09 (1992) (South Carolina Coastal Council decision); Pa. Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1922) (Pennsylvania statute). For additional cases, see infra 
note 69. The federal government generates its share of cases that shape takings doctrine as 
well. See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 516–19 (2013) (USDA raisin 
program); Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 26–28 (2012) (federal 
flood control); Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3–7 (1984) 
(condemnation for a national preserve); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41 (1960) 
(federal contracting). But in the sweep of takings jurisprudence, local governments have 
consistently been front and center. See infra section I.B. 
 6. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472–75 (2005) (eminent 
domain for local economic development); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–30 (1954) 
(eminent domain for urban renewal). 
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constitutional limits of exactions,7 and across the heartland of regulatory 
takings.8 And data on takings cases in the lower courts underscore the 
centrality of local governments to takings jurisprudence.9 
Although local democracy stands at the center of takings jurispru-
dence, state legislatures have played a remarkably active role in structuring 
local power over property. This state legislative oversight has come in a 
variety of forms. Some state statutes make it easier for owners to obtain 
compensation when they face local regulations, by lowering the liability 
threshold below what case law sets or by limiting governmental defenses 
in takings cases.10 Other state statutes impose significant procedural 
burdens on local governments, such as takings impact assessment 
requirements and individualized negotiation mandates, designed to 
discourage the adoption of local regulations.11 Still other statutes constrain 
outright specific local-government powers in the realms of eminent 
domain, tenant protections, environmental preservation, and beyond.12 A 
fourth category of statutes empowers owners to resist the exercise of local 
government authority in areas such as historic preservation and land-use 
permitting.13 
Assessments of property rights statutes have long been a staple of the 
literature.14 Scholars, however, have not framed the full range and depth 
                                                                                                                           
 7. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377–80 (1994) (local government 
flood prevention and transportation schemes). The term “exactions” describes “certain 
conditions that are attached to land-use permits issued at the government’s discretion”  
that “ostensibly oblige property owners to internalize the costs of the expected 
infrastructural, environmental, and social harms resulting from development.” Timothy 
M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 137, 
137–38 (2016). 
 8. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–38 (1978) (setting 
the modern framework for regulatory takings in a case challenging New York City’s historic 
preservation law). And, of course, the leading case on defining the relevant parcel for 
regulatory takings is a local government case. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1939–
40 (2017) (county-level lot-merger rules). 
 9. See generally James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit 
Takings, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 35 (2016) (analyzing all lower court takings decisions 
between 1978 and 2012 and finding that the overwhelming majority involved local 
governments). For additional detail, see infra note 108. 
 10. See infra section II.A. 
 11. See infra section II.B. 
 12. See infra section II.C. 
 13. See infra section II.D. 
 14. On compensation statutes, see, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the 
Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 Ecology L.Q. 187, 212–20 (1997) 
(examining Texas and Florida compensation statutes); John D. Echeverria & Thekla 
Hansen-Young, The Track Record on Takings Legislation: Lessons from Democracy’s 
Laboratories, 28 Stan. Env’t L.J. 439, 447–99 (2009) (discussing Florida and Oregon 
property rights legislation); Robert H. Freilich & RoxAnne Doyle, Takings Legislation: 
Misguided and Dangerous, 46 Land Use L. & Zoning Dig. 3, 3–4 (1994) (discussing 
opposition to takings legislation, including criticism of its potential fiscal impact and 
bureaucratic costs); Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a 
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of this state ordering of local authority in core areas of takings 
jurisprudence as a fundamental question of state–local relations.15 
Understanding property rights statutes as state preemption highlights the 
connection between this state legislation and the rise of a broad and 
contentious contemporary wave of state intervention that is similarly 
sweeping.16 
                                                                                                                           
Response to “Environmental Takings”, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 613, 635–38 (1995) (discussing how 
compensation bills are a form of property rights protection); Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings 
Bills Threaten Private Property, People, and the Environment, 8 Fordham Env’t L.J. 521, 
567–87 (1997) (arguing that compensation bills would harm property rights by 
undermining “environmental, conservation and other laws that prevent harms to . . . private 
property, health, and natural resources”). On eminent domain reform, see, e.g., James W. 
Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 127, 
133–48 (2009) (reviewing states’ legislative and judicial efforts to reform eminent domain); 
Harvey M. Jacobs & Ellen M. Bassett, All Sound, No Fury? The Impacts of State-Based Kelo 
Laws, 63 Plan. & Env’t L. 3, 6–8 (2011) (outlining the impact of eminent domain reform 
legislation on land-use planning); Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of 
State and Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 Ecology L.Q. 703, 726–
27 (2011) (summarizing general trends in legislation relating to eminent domain); Andrew 
P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo, 17 
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 237, 270–76 (2009) (examining various reasons why states adopted 
eminent domain reform legislation through regression analysis); Ilya Somin, The Limits of 
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100, 2114 (2009) 
[hereinafter Somin, Political Response to Kelo] (challenging the claim that the state 
legislation enacted to limit the power of eminent domain in Kelo’s immediate wake largely 
serves the same end as a judicial bar on the use of eminent domain for economic 
development purposes). 
 15. Some scholars, to be sure, have fruitfully differentiated between states and local 
governments in takings law. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About 
Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1681, 1693–701 (2007) [Rose, What Federalism 
Tells Us] (criticizing takings doctrine for failing to account for the distinct competencies of 
the various levels of government); Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small 
Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1624, 1680–85 
(2006) [hereinafter Serkin, Big Differences] (proposing a reduction in takings 
compensation awards leveled against local governments to account for their general risk 
aversion on fiscal issues); Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of 
Property Protection, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 883, 905–08 (2007) [hereinafter Serkin, Local 
Property] (proposing that local governments generally should be allowed to determine the 
level of property protection they want to afford within their boundaries); see also William 
A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government 
Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies 4–5 (2005) [hereinafter Fischel, 
Homevoter Hypothesis] (contending that, given the incentives that arise from the 
concentration of investments in their homes, homeowners have more influence on the 
efficiency of local governments than they do on that of state or federal governments); 
William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 328–29 (1995) 
(arguing that local governments are more responsive to fiscal pressures than higher levels 
of government, and therefore, efficiency is best served by subjecting local governments to a 
more stringent level of takings scrutiny than their state and federal counterparts). This 
literature, however, has not focused on the broad ways in which property rights statutes have 
reordered the vertical allocation of authority within the states. 
 16. The literature on takings federalism attends as well to the horizontal distribution 
of decisionmaking power within the judiciary. Indeed, discerning which court system should 
resolve takings cases—a question that implicates the relative competency and theoretical 
220 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:215 
Over the past decade, state preemption of local authority has 
morphed from its traditional focus on justifiably advancing state regulatory 
standards and policing significant interlocal conflicts as specific contexts 
dictate, to the alarm of many state and local government legal scholars.17 
Today, states often do little to justify preemption that has become 
increasingly expansive, targeted, polarized, and even punitive. Examples 
of what Professor Richard Briffault has labeled the “new preemption”18 
range across almost every area of local authority, from employee pro-
tections to public health to housing to civil rights.19 This has amounted to 
a fundamental reordering of the state–local legal relationship, generating 
calls for reform to protect against instances where states are unjustifiably 
undermining local democracy.20 
The new preemption and burgeoning responses to concerns with 
unjustified state interference are instructive for evaluating state constraints 
                                                                                                                           
comparable costs and benefits of state or federal venues for the resolution of constitutional-
property questions, as well as the relationship between courts and states—has long been the 
primary focus of the discourse. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Not Just a Procedural Case: The 
Substantive Implications of Knick for State Property Law and Federal Takings Doctrine, 47 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 591, 593 (2020) [hereinafter Dana, Implications of Knick] (observing 
that the Supreme Court’s recent overturning of Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), in Knick v. Township 
of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), may be an “impediment to the productive adaption of state 
property law to . . . climate change”); Daniel L. Siegel, Why We Will Probably Never See a 
Judicial Takings Doctrine, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 459, 459–62, 465–67 (2010) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court is unlikely to create a judicial takings doctrine because doing so would 
ignore state sovereignty and disregard common law). This vein of the literature, again, does 
not focus on the vertical distribution of decisionmaking power over takings within the states. 
 17. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 
1995, 1999–2008, 2017–25 (2018) [hereinafter Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption] 
(analyzing the spread of a new, more punitive form of state preemption of local government 
action and legal doctrines available to challenge it); Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of 
Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 Yale L.J. 954, 984–1000 (2019) [hereinafter 
Davidson, Dilemma of Localism] (advocating, in the pursuit of equity, for a greater focus 
on the normative dimensions of localism); Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A 
Reordering of the State–Local Relationship?, 106 Geo. L.J. 1469, 1504–07 (2018) (arguing 
that “hyper preemption” statutes undermine local government action more than traditional 
preemption statutes); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 
1163, 1184–88 (2018) [hereinafter Schragger, The Attack on American Cities] (asserting 
that current state–city conflicts represent a larger trend of state aggrandizement and 
hostility toward local power). 
 18. Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption, supra note 17, at 1997 (defining new 
preemption as “sweeping state laws that clearly, intentionally, extensively, and at times 
punitively bar local efforts to address a host of local problems”). 
 19. See generally Richard Briffault, Nestor M. Davidson & Laurie Reynolds, The New 
Preemption Reader: Legislation, Cases, and Commentary on the Leading Challenge 
in Today’s State and Local Government Law (2019) (collecting statutes, cases, and 
commentary on the new preemption). 
 20. See infra section III.A. 
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on local authority in the areas of property law most germane to takings.21 
Takings jurisprudence guides changes in property law in ways that 
maintain property’s character as a healthy, fair, and just democratic 
institution. The formalist rigidity and undue uniformity imposed by state 
preemption make it difficult for takings law to serve this vital role. The 
current allocation of authority within the states, in short, fails to honor the 
deference and respect for local democracy so evident within the core of 
takings jurisprudence.22 
In the face of this imbalance, this Article proposes a context-sensitive 
framework for rebalancing the vertical distribution of decisionmaking 
power within the states. Local governments are where the costs and 
benefits of property regulation are felt most immediately, making the local 
democratic process particularly apt for evaluating tradeoffs at the heart of 
takings law; moreover, local governments are well suited to respond to 
local preferences and innovate in the face of changing conditions.23 At the 
same time, local governments can be parochial and exclusionary, and the 
immobility of property creates special vulnerabilities for owners in the 
local political economy. State interventions more directly targeted at those 
specific pathologies, however, may be preferable to approaches that 
broadly undermine important aspects of local democracy.24 
Highlighting these and related characteristics of local governments is 
not to advocate, in some dispositive and general fashion, the preeminence 
of local decisionmaking over the states on the myriad property issues that 
animate takings law. Rather, these characteristics demonstrate the value of 
a more contextualized analysis that the rigid takings-related state statutes 
largely preclude. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the dynamics of fed-
eralism at the heart of contemporary takings jurisprudence and the under-
appreciated centrality of local governance within those dynamics. Part II 
turns to cataloguing the many ways that state legislatures have structured 
local authority in constitutional property—a comprehensive analysis of 
property rights legislation as state preemption absent in the current 
literature. Finally, Part III links this state ordering of local authority to the 
rise of new preemption and normative concerns the phenomenon has 
                                                                                                                           
 21. This Article focuses on the Takings Clause, but it bears acknowledging that 
constitutional property also involves claims arising under the Due Process Clause, the Equal 
Protection Clause, and other federal and state constitutional provisions. 
 22. Takings is not the only mechanism within property law that strikes a balance 
between individual rights and community needs, of course. It is, however, a particularly 
salient and critical proving ground for that balance, with influence in property discourse 
that merits sustained focus. 
 23. See infra section III.B. 
 24. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 976–78 (reviewing normative 
and pragmatic critiques of local authority); see also David Schleicher, Constitutional Law 
for NIMBYs: A Review of “Principles of Home Rule for the 21st Century” by the National 
League of Cities, 81 Ohio St. L.J. 883, 903–05 (2020) (critiquing a recent reform proposal 
for enhancing local authority). 
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engendered in the discourse on state and local government law. This 
Article accordingly concludes with a call for a recalibration that would give 
greater recognition—again, within the wide margins set by the juris-
prudence—to the important role that local governance plays in takings 
law. This “takings localism” has the potential to deepen our understanding 
of the intersection between local authority and the construction of con-
stitutional property at a moment when the most fundamental questions 
about that intersection are increasingly fraught. 
I. FEDERALISM AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TAKINGS 
The protections afforded by the Takings Clause are inextricably 
bound up with the fact that states in our legal system define the boundaries 
of many important property interests. While other federal constitutional 
rights, such as those protected by the Contracts Clause, interact with state-
grounded aspects of common law doctrine, the definitional power of the 
states in the realm of property creates a particularly sharp dilemma: If 
states can define property, what baseline should courts use to determine 
whether there has been a change in property law requiring compensation?25 
This state role risks undermining takings protections by ceding 
definitional authority to the states—what Justice Kennedy once described 
as placing a “Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”26 Despite that 
risk, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed state authority in 
takings, reflecting the highly contextual nature of the balance between 
individual rights and community imperatives in constitutional property. 
Thus, although demarcating some broad outer constitutional boundaries, 
the Court has seemed generally content to respond to Justice Holmes’s 
Zen-koan-like query—when does a regulation go “too far?”27—with a 
                                                                                                                           
 25. As a doctrinal matter, the precise interplay between state law and constitutional 
protection for property rights continues to vex the courts. As Professor Thomas Merrill has 
noted, property for constitutional purposes could be understood as a purely state-defined 
concept (whether in positivist terms or as natural-law inflected), as having independent 
federal constitutional meaning, or as a federal–state hybrid—what he has described as a 
“patterning” definition. See Thomas W. Merrill, Choice of Law in Takings Cases, 8 Brigham-
Kanner Prop. Rts. Conf. J. 45, 46–51 (2019) (identifying federal constitutional law and state 
law as sources of law in takings cases and advocating for “federal-patterning” as “a federal 
constitutional articulation of how the question should broadly be resolved, leaving the 
specific details to be filled in as a matter of state law”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape 
of Constitutional Property, 86 Va. L. Rev. 885, 893, 942–54 (2000) (rejecting both “natural 
property” and “pure positivist” definitions of property and instead promoting a “patterning 
definition”). The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this debate in Murr v. Wisconsin 
can be read as endorsing a federal approach to the definition of property for purposes of 
the Takings Clause, albeit an approach explicitly influenced by state doctrine. See 137 S. Ct. 
1933, 1945 (2017) (listing as among the factors courts should consider in delineating a 
parcel “the treatment of the land under state and local law”). Murr, though, will hardly be 
the last word on this interplay. 
 26. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001). 
 27. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (stating that “if regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking”). 
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political-procedural answer: generally, where the public, through the 
democratic process within the states, has drawn the line.28 Section I.A 
elaborates on this federalist dimension of takings and the debate it has 
spawned in the literature. 
That most of the types of property disputes that have found their way 
to the center of takings law are resolved through the states’ political 
processes, however, raises a less appreciated question of the allocation of 
power within the states. As section I.B explains, a notably broad swath of 
major takings cases have involved local governments. The deference the 
Supreme Court has shown to the democratic process in takings federalism 
thus raises critical vertical allocation-of-power questions that do not stop 
at the federal–state boundary. 
A.  Understanding Takings Federalism 
The entire panoply of takings doctrine—not just regulatory takings, 
but related questions about the scope of eminent domain and the 
procedures that govern in takings cases—has long been decried as a 
muddle.29 In practice, though, some basic patterns have emerged in the 
jurisprudence.30 Cases involving the direct exercise of eminent domain 
tend to hinge on technical issues, like questions of valuation,31 though 
there are some challenging outer-margin issues when the power is 
exercised for policies like economic development.32 Regulatory takings 
claims, in turn, are either channeled into the small handful of nominally 
“per se” categories that generate very few actual cases,33 or, in the 
                                                                                                                           
 28. As Professors James Krier and Stewart Sterk have succinctly noted, “[b]y and large, 
political processes, not judicial doctrine, . . . serve as the primary check on government 
activity” in the takings context. Krier & Sterk, supra note 9, at 35. 
 29. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom 
Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 826, 883 (2006); 
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 561, 561 (1984). 
 30. On the emergence of patterns through the application of context-sensitive 
standards, see, for example, Timothy M. Mulvaney, Walling Out: Rules and Standards in the 
Beach Access Context, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 123–24) (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review); Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property 
Law, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1369, 1402–05 (2013). 
 31. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value, Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 682–704 (2005) (noting that “[c]ourts . . . are 
much more likely to discuss compensation in the context of eminent domain proceedings” 
than in the context of regulatory takings challenges). 
 32. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–80 (2005) (considering 
the meaning of “public use”). 
 33. These categories include regulations that deny an owner “all economically 
beneficial or productive use of land,” Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 
(1992), and regulations that create a permanent physical occupation of property, see 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–40 (1982). These 
categories only nominally create “per se” regulatory takings liability because embedded in 
them are threshold questions, such as determining how permanent is “permanent.” See, 
224 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:215 
overwhelming majority of cases, resolved through the open-textured 
framework laid out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.34 
And while the Court is still grappling with the boundaries of “exactions”—
a peculiar species of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that is based 
on underlying takings claims35—the doctrinal contours of what has come 
to be known as exaction takings law have been in place for decades.36 
Despite this relative stability, courts have not, at least in any strict 
sense, endorsed a single, overarching theoretical theme to justify this 
doctrinal landscape. Rather, they have all but engraved an invitation to 
scholars to advance competing normative and pragmatic conceptions of 
constitutional property protection. One prominent way of understanding 
the purpose and function of the Takings Clause, then, foregrounds the 
incentives that a constitutional compensation mandate provides for both 
governmental actors and owners. In this view, takings law polices against 
what scholars call fiscal illusion: the risk that public decisionmaking will be 
“mispriced” if government officials can act without internalizing the costs 
of their actions.37 Similarly, scholars in this efficiency-oriented vein have 
                                                                                                                           
e.g., id. at 428. There are also additional qualifications. The state, for example, may eliminate 
all economic value without compensation if the relevant prohibition was embodied in 
background principles of state law. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. On the paucity of cases 
that involve the Supreme Court’s categorical rules, see Krier & Sterk, supra note 9, at 55–62. 
 34. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 35. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013) (exaction takings 
case); see also Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (noting the ongoing uncertainty about whether 
administrative exactions should be evaluated differently than legislative exactions). 
 36. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (establishing that, under the 
Takings Clause, a condition attached to a development permit must exhibit “rough 
proportionality” to the approved development’s anticipated impacts); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (establishing that, under the Takings Clause, there must 
be an “essential nexus” between a condition attached to a development and the approved 
development’s anticipated impacts). 
 37. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An 
Economic Analysis, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 569, 620–22 (1984) (explaining that “[f]iscal illusion arises 
because the costs of governmental actions are generally discounted by the decisionmaking 
body,” and that compensation can “serve as a corrective device” for this “governmental 
failure”). This rationale for compensation has been the subject of sustained criticism. See, 
e.g., Bethany R. Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings, 66 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 1, 16–37 (2016) [hereinafter Berger, The Illusion] (arguing that the fiscal-illusion 
hypothesis ignores governmental incentives to manage land use to maximize revenue 
through property taxation, and thus a compensation mandate undermines regulatory social-
cost internalization); Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government 
Fiscally Blind? An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement 
on Eminent-Domain Exercises, 45 J. Legal Stud. 437, 457–63 (2016) (offering an empirical 
analysis that calls into question the centrality of the fiscal-illusion argument for mandating 
compensation); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 363–67 (2000) (arguing that 
political actors generally respond to political, not fiscal, incentives and that while the 
compensation mandate may deter some inefficient regulations, fiscal incentives generally 
will not systematically prevent inefficiency). Nevertheless, the fiscal-illusion rationale 
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argued that calibrating compensation properly is necessary to prevent 
moral hazard for owners, who might be inclined to overinvest in property 
in the presence of supramarket compensation.38 
The Supreme Court itself has often, if not entirely consistently, been 
less concerned explicitly with public and private incentives and more 
focused on a different normative vision and operative principle. In 
Armstrong v. United States, the Supreme Court famously stated that the 
Takings Clause is “designed to bar Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.”39 This concern with the allocation of the 
burdens of regulatory change echoes across many aspects of the juris-
prudence,40 and scholars have elaborated its implications in some detail.41 
                                                                                                                           
remains prominent in takings dialogue. See Christopher Serkin, Response, The Fiscal 
Illusion Zombie: The Undead Theory of Government Regulatory Incentives, 66 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 1433, 1457 (2017) (“[F]iscal illusion relies upon an implausible, even bizarre, 
assumption . . . [but] it continues to be invoked as a justification for expansive takings 
protection.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 29, 
35–38 (2003) (arguing for a “contributory negligence” rule in which property owners would 
not be compensated if they were to “overdevelop” their property). 
 A significant literature elaborates on takings as a means of optimizing the efficiency of 
regulatory transitions. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 
99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 615–17 (1986) (arguing that relying on market forces to determine 
the effect of government action is more efficient than transitional relief by the government); 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Response, Takings, Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response to 
Professor Dagan, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 157, 167 (2000) (noting that takings compensation can 
create inefficiencies where short-term fiscal constraints prevent the government from 
proceeding with regulations that offer long-term benefits on net); Carol M. Rose, Property 
and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 1, 18–21 
(describing regulatory takings law as serving to mediate regulatory transitions). 
 39. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 40. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012) 
(describing the Armstrong principle as a guidepost that is “fundamental in . . . Takings 
Clause jurisprudence”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 
(1978) (“[T]his court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for 
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public 
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately 
concentrated on a few persons.” (quoting Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 
594 (1961))). 
 41. The literature on the role of fairness and justice—in distributional and other moral 
valences—of takings law is voluminous to say the least. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings 
and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741, 743 (1999) (offering a “doctrine that 
distinguishes a regulation from a taking with a view to both civic virtues and egalitarian 
concerns”); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1172 (1967) (arguing that 
“the attempt to formulate rules of decision for compensability cases has, with suggestive 
consistency, yielded rules which are ethically unsatisfying”); Andrea L. Peterson, The 
Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II—Takings as Intentional 
Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 53, 162 (1990) (“The 
Justices appear to be following the intuition that fairness does not require that 
compensation be paid if the government is simply stopping the claimant from doing 
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The Armstrong principle, however, for all of its visceral appeal, hardly 
provides determinant jurisprudential answers in all cases, and the Supreme 
Court seems to have little interest in offering a clearer resolution.42 
Approaching the jurisprudence and underlying conceptual tensions 
through a different lens, other scholars have tried to make sense of takings 
in institutional terms. Political-process theories of takings are ubiquitous,43 
and one relatively common element of those theories focuses on the 
allocation of decisional power. A particularly trenchant institutionalist 
approach emphasizes the relationship between federal constitutional 
doctrine and the states, in what Professor Stewart Sterk has labeled the 
“federalist dimension” of constitutional property.44 
                                                                                                                           
something wrong . . . .”); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 61–
76 (1964) (advancing a framework that “should determine the issue of compensation” in 
takings cases); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149, 
155 (1971) [hereinafter Sax, Private Property and Public Rights] (“An important question 
is whether these [broadly felt] costs should be allowed to remain where they fall, or whether 
instead the interests which are diffusely held should be recognized and advanced in the 
form of ‘public rights.’”); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of 
Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 309, 328–38 
(2006) [hereinafter Singer, The Ownership Society] (arguing that a property model 
focusing on citizens’ obligations and rights can help clarify takings jurisprudence). 
 42. It bears acknowledging, however, that the Supreme Court may be on the cusp of a 
shift in its Takings Clause jurisprudence as a matter of the realpolitik of the current 
alignment of Justices. In the years before his retirement in 2018, Justice Kennedy supplied 
the deciding vote in several closely contested constitutional property cases, much as he did 
in other contentious areas of law. See, e.g., Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2017) 
(Kennedy, J.). Justice Kennedy has now been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh, who, by 
indications to date, will take a generally property rights-protective approach to takings cases. 
See Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson & Greg Stohr, Kavanaugh Key Vote as Justices Overturn 
Property Rights Case (2), Bloomberg L. (June 21, 2019), https://news. 
bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/kavanaugh-key-vote-as-justices-overturn-property-precedent 
[https://perma.cc/F6HV-NE94] (noting that Justice Kavanaugh was likely the deciding 
vote in Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), a decision that overturned a 
decades-old precedent that had been seen as limiting property rights). As the Supreme 
Court’s recently constituted conservative majority does not seem particularly bound by 
fidelity to precedent, the democracy-reinforcing vein of takings jurisprudence predominant 
since Penn Central that defers to the political process may yield to more hard-edged 
categorical approaches. Cf. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision can only cause one to wonder which cases the 
Court will overrule next.”). 
 43. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings 
Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 855–87 (1995) (laying out a political-
process-based theory of the Just Compensation Clause). 
 44. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 3, at 207. Other federalism-inflected 
takings literature attends less to the horizontal distribution of decisionmaking power 
between courts and the states and more to the vertical distribution of decisionmaking power 
within the courts. See, e.g., Dana, Implications of Knick, supra note 16, at 605–13 (discussing 
the substantive and procedural discourse in takings federalism); Siegel, supra note 16, at 
461 (arguing that state courts have advantages over federal courts in developing property 
law that reflects each state’s “unique history and physical landscape”). Neither vein of 
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Professor Sterk’s account foregrounds the positivist puzzle inherent 
in constitutional property.45 As the Supreme Court has made increasingly 
clear, “background principles” of a state’s law of property play a central 
role in the regulatory takings inquiry—a consideration that had always 
undergirded the jurisprudence but was made explicit by the Court in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council.46 Background principles are now central 
to a panoply of regulatory takings issues, including shaping the 
reasonableness of owner expectations47 and even, following Murr v. 
Wisconsin, in terms of the definition of the property interest that is the 
object of regulation.48 Centering the state’s definitional role in property 
risks circularity—how can a regulatory change to a property interest 
contravene the Takings Clause if the state is empowered to define property 
interests? In practice, however, this positivist puzzle is unavoidable.49 
                                                                                                                           
takings federalism literature, however, has sufficiently focused on the vertical distribution 
of decisionmaking power within the states. See infra Part III. 
 45. As Professor Frank Michelman described this legal-positivist puzzle: 
By an argument that reaches back at least to Bentham, property’s scope 
and content—property’s existence, even—are completely dependent 
upon standing law. Thus, in contrast with liberty, property cannot stand 
while the laws fall. My property is that to which the laws currently in force 
give me a secured entitlement. In a vacuum of such laws, there can be no 
property . . . . 
 . . . . 
. . . This state of the doctrine means that questions about the content and 
meaning of historical state property law are potentially in issue every time 
someone complains in court that a state government has violated the 
Federal Constitution by taking property without paying for it. If a taking 
of property can occur only when a government in some way perpetrates a 
departure from the then-existing body of property law, then in order to 
tell whether a given state action takes property you have to know what the 
State’s property law as a matter of fact is—what that law as a matter of fact 
says—at the moment when the action complained of takes place. 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and 
Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301, 305–10 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
 46. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–29 (1992) (holding that even regulations that deprive land of 
all economically beneficial use need not be compensated if the limitations in the regulation 
“inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of 
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership”). 
 47. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629–30 (2001) (noting that while not 
dispositive, a state’s law of property—even statutory enactments—can shape owner expectations 
over time). 
 48. See 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017) (“[C]ourts should give substantial weight to the 
treatment of the land, in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law. 
The reasonable expectations of an acquirer of land must acknowledge legitimate 
restrictions affecting his or her subsequent use and dispensation of the property.”). 
 49. This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court’s normative preference for state 
common law in defining “background principles,” at the expense of other sources of state 
law such as state statutory and administrative law, is at all justified. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, 
Foreground Principles, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 837, 866–77 (2013) (advocating a contex-
tualized analysis that recognizes that background principles of the common law are 
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Professor Sterk outlines some distinctive jurisprudential challenges 
arising from the intertwined state–federal structure of property rights. 
First, the variation inherent in state law makes takings claims more 
complex because “background principles” inherently vary from state to 
state (and even potentially from locality to locality).50 What might 
constitute a perfectly acceptable limitation on the expectations of owners 
in New York City might be constitutionally intolerable in rural Montana. 
This variational complexity, in turn, undermines the value of Supreme 
Court guidance.51 When the Court, as it does in most contexts, imports 
state-specific background principles into the equation, any resulting 
decisional guidance can hardly set clear rules for governmental and 
private actors—except, of course, to reinforce deference to the political 
process.52 
For Professor Sterk, however, this variation and complexity has virtues 
worth embracing. The values of federalism, Sterk argues, support a 
distributed regime that places state institutions—state law and state 
courts—at the center of property protection.53 State courts and state 
legislatures are institutionally well suited to oversee local land-use 
regulation, on this view, because they are “insulated from many of the 
pressures that face local regulators.”54 Other scholars have elaborated on 
                                                                                                                           
insufficient, in and of themselves, to address modern problems and to serve modern human 
needs). 
 50. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 3, at 226–27; see also Maureen E. Brady,  
Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for Property 
Federalism, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 53, 56 (2017) (“Murr gives individual states’ positive 
law of property short shrift, replacing the inquiry into the form and content of property 
within a single jurisdiction with an analysis of reasonable property rules and expectations 
that is divorced from jurisdictional boundaries.”). Sterk focused on the federalist dimension 
of regulatory takings, but some of the same positivist complexity can be at play in aspects of 
eminent domain as well, particularly with respect to questions of valuation and, to a lesser 
extent (because it is not dependent on any given state’s definition of property) with respect 
to the scope of public use in eminent domain. 
 51. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 3, at 228–33. 
 52. This deference to the political branches has significant implications for the 
allocation of decisionmaking about the constitutional boundaries of property. See infra 
Parts II and III. 
 53. See Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 3, at 257–71 (“[T]he Court’s limited 
intervention recognizes that property rights are the product of positive law created by the 
several states and preserves the freedom of the states to define and protect those rights.”). 
It bears drawing a distinction between federalism in the sense of procedural channeling—the 
interplay of state and federal courts as venues for resolving takings claims, as raised by 
Knick—and the substantive allocation of authority in terms of which body of law (federal, 
state, or a hybrid) actually defines the boundaries of constitutional property. Which venues 
are available and which substantive rules govern those venues are, of course, potentially 
connected. Federal courts might bring different perspectives, resources, and institutional 
capacity than state courts; state courts might be more attentive to local variation and political 
process. But which legal system decides constitutional questions and which body of law 
governs are not the same thing. 
 54. Id. at 206. 
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arguments for decentralizing to the states in constitutional property by 
emphasizing, for example, the values of experimentalism and interstate 
competition for mobile residents and capital.55 And, as others have noted, 
the traditional values of federalism—accountability, distributed power, 
targeting, and responsiveness to preferences—can be a part of 
rationalizing the centrality of states to takings law.56 
This federalist reality—and it is hard to deny that this is functionally 
how our system of constitutional property operates—has raised concerns 
for some scholars. Commentators, for example, argue that relegating run-
of-the-mill takings concerns to the states treats property under the Takings 
Clause as a second-class right, especially given the low threshold for 
protecting property that the Supreme Court has set.57 Takings federalism, 
the critique continues, undermines the value of uniformity no less in this 
context than a democratically minimalist First Amendment or equal 
protection doctrine would.58 
A more targeted critique has come from scholars who question 
whether the basic values inherent in federalism (or at least the protection 
afforded by the states) bears out for takings. Professor Ilya Somin, for 
example, argues that federalism is an insufficient protection because the 
normal discipline of mobility does not work for owners unable to move 
their property without considerable difficulty.59 And Professor Somin is 
even more skeptical of federalism arguments sounding in the value of 
superior knowledge at the state level, arguing that as between any 
governmental actor and owners themselves, the latter has greater expertise 
about their specific property and local conditions.60 
Whatever one thinks of these critiques, however, the upshot of the 
actual landscape of takings doctrine presents, at least in a functional sense, 
                                                                                                                           
 55. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 
Yale L.J. 72, 92–101 (2005) (drawing on the literature on state competition in corporate law 
as well as the mobility and public goods paradigm associated with Charles Tiebout to argue 
for the utility of interstate competition in property). 
 56. See, e.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and 
Local Land Use Decisions, 59 Md. L. Rev. 464, 490–513 (2000) (discussing the interplay 
between the values of federalism and takings doctrine); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 888, 891–92 
(2006) (defending deference in takings in light of federalism values). 
 57. See, e.g., Berger, What’s Federalism, supra note 2, at 12 (“If there is a role for 
federalism, it lies in providing a mechanism for the states to provide more protection to 
individuals than the U.S. Constitution mandates. Period.”). 
 58. Id. at 12–14 (asserting that uniformity in decisions regarding constitutional rights 
typically supersedes federalism concerns and should do so for property rights as well). 
 59. Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 2, at 58 (“The main difficulty 
with such competitive federalism arguments is that they fail to take adequate account of the 
immobility of property rights in land.”). 
 60. Id. at 66; see also id. at 67 (arguing that “the argument from expertise and 
interstate diversity would, if applied consistently, justify eliminating judicial protection of a 
wide range of constitutional rights, not just property rights”). 
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a deeply democratic vision of constitutional property,61 with the relevant 
democratic process grounded in the states.62 This is not to argue that the 
right to property protected by the Fifth Amendment is inherently 
minimal—clearly that is not the case. But for the role that the Takings 
Clause plays in constraining regulatory choice and setting the limits of 
legitimate public use, the Supreme Court has made clear—again within 
broad outer boundaries—that the political arena is the appropriate one 
for resolving the tradeoffs inherent in balancing individual ownership and 
community imperatives. In practice, evaluating the allocation of burdens 
in property transitions demands deeply contextualized value judgments 
about owner expectations, the texture of harm to the public that any given 
regulation is addressing, and even more fundamental questions about the 
nature of markets and larger constitutional values.63 Takings law thus 
serves in our legal system to vindicate a “right to justification,”64 but it does 
so in a way that reinforces property’s role as a fundamentally democratic 
institution. 
One way to understand Professor Sterk’s essential insight, ultimately, 
is that when the Supreme Court sets a relatively low baseline of property 
protection, it is implicitly empowering the states to determine the 
appropriate calibration of individual rights and community needs, and 
thereby endorsing variation on that calibration exercise, rather than a 
strong, singular standard. This is not dissimilar from how most rights work, 
such as in the context of speech, equality, due process, and other 
fundamental rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court always sets a floor of 
uniformity above which state and local political systems are free to offer 
greater protection. But constitutional property distinctively elevates, within 
very wide outer boundaries, the role of state positive law—and political 
process—in determining the baseline for federal constitutional 
protection. 
                                                                                                                           
 61. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 145, 150–58 
(2018) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings] (articulating a democratic 
approach to regulatory takings law); Singer, The Ownership Society, supra note 41, at 330 
(arguing that property law exhibits a “citizenship model” in which owners undertake duties 
to “refrain from actions that endanger . . . a free and democratic society that treats all 
individuals with equal concerns and respect”). 
 62. In a recent essay, Professor Carol Rose offers a more critical view. See Carol M. 
Rose, Rations and Takings, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 343, 359 (suggesting that while the Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence generally shows a “pattern of tolerance” toward state and 
local land regulation of property, the jurisprudence is “punctuated by cannonades that 
undermine state and local resource management”). This Article does not argue that the 
Supreme Court is intentionally deferential to state and local political processes out of some 
respect for the comparative advantages of subfederal governance. Rather, because the 
Supreme Court has developed a jurisprudence that relegates the overwhelming majority of 
cases to tests that are functionally politically deferential—albeit, as Professor Rose notes, 
with some blunt exceptions—the result is a doctrine that privileges the political process. 
 63. See Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, supra note 61, at 158. 
 64. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rainer Forst, The Right to 
Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice 2 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2012)). 
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B.  Unpacking the States: Local Governments in Constitutional Property 
If much of the texture of property interests in takings law is 
determined democratically within the states, it is critical to remember that 
in that project of constitutional explication, states are not unitary. States 
govern in many fundamental ways through local governments, particularly 
so in policy domains such as land use and infrastructure that frequently 
raise constitutional property rights questions. As a result, local govern-
ments are central to the democratic construction of constitutional prop-
erty. Although familiar ground, this section rehearses the litany of critical 
constitutional property cases that have involved local governments to 
illustrate their role across the breadth of the doctrine. 
The proper regulatory role for local governments is increasingly 
contested,65 but authority over land use and the built environment has 
always been at the center of local lawmaking in the United States.66 That 
continues to be true today, with local governments playing the primary 
regulatory role not only on questions of zoning, subdivision regulation, 
development permitting, and other foundational matters of land-use law, 
but also—more controversially—in housing law, rent regulation, 
environmental protection, historic preservation, and the like.67 All of these 
distinctly local regulatory regimes have generated important takings cases. 
There are, of course, many significant takings cases where the federal 
government is the defendant,68 and the same can be said about the states.69 
                                                                                                                           
 65. Compare Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 15–18 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism] 
(arguing that local governments have long “wielded substantial lawmaking power and 
undertaken important public initiatives”), with Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 
supra note 17, at 1184–95 (arguing that “hostility to city regulation” is an “enduring feature 
of American federalism”). 
 66. See Stuart Banner, American Property: A History of How, Why, and What We Own 
182–85 (2011) (discussing the long history of local government land-use regulation); John 
F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1252, 1259–81 (1996) (recounting the Founding-era local-land-use regulatory 
landscape); see also Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, 
Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 231, 236 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing 
descriptive and normative view of land use involves, first and foremost, local control.”). 
 67. See, e.g., John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a 
Housing Crisis, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 823, 832–34 (2019) (discussing the controversy regarding 
the “ideal vertical allocation of power between state and local governments” in housing 
regulation); Katrina M. Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban Environmental 
Renaissance, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 305, 337–47 (2020) (describing a new wave of urban 
environmental laws as local governments begin regulating environmental protection). 
 68. See supra note 5. 
 69. For a seminal case, see Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1922) 
(challenging Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act). For others, see supra note 5; see also Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987) (Pennsylvania Subsidence 
Act); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984) (Hawaii Land Reform Act of 
1967); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415–16 (1934) (Minnesota 
Mortgage Moratorium Law); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 653 (1887) (Kansas liquor law). 
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But a broad array of major takings cases over the century since Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon70 have involved local governments.71 
Not surprisingly, to begin, cases involving the boundaries of public 
use for condemning property implicate distinctly local challenges. A 
paradigm example is the case that set the contemporary terms of “public 
use” under the Takings Clause, Berman v. Parker.72 Berman grew out of the 
post–World War II wave of urban redevelopment sparked by the federal 
American Housing Act of 1949 and grappled with the problem of blight 
and condemnation in the urban core (in this case, southwest Washington, 
D.C.).73 A little more than fifty years later, the Supreme Court in Kelo v. 
City of New London again returned to the scope of public use, grappling 
with questions arising from modern iterations of urban renewal and 
whether eminent domain can be deployed for economic development.74 
Defining the relevant property interest and parcel for purposes of 
regulatory takings has likewise implicated local governments. The leading 
case on point now, Murr v. Wisconsin, involved a challenge to a county-level 
ordinance that mandated lot mergers.75 But the modern debate about 
conceptual severance—the question of the “denominator” in regulatory 
takings cases—can be traced in large measure to Penn Central’s debate 
about the appropriate parcel at issue in that case.76 
Of course, the largest category of regulatory takings cases involves 
local authority over land use and the built environment. The litany of such 
cases is long and covers everything from basic zoning77 to historic 
                                                                                                                           
 70. 260 U.S. at 393. 
 71. Cf. Michael Allan Wolf, The Brooding Omnipresence of Regulatory Takings: 
Urban Origins and Effects, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1835, 1837–39 (2013) (noting the 
distinctly urban setting of many classic regulatory takings conflicts, from Scranton in Mahon 
to New York City in Penn Central and many other examples). Not to fetishize the Supreme 
Court, especially given the reality that most takings cases are resolved at the state level or by 
the lower federal courts, but the terms of the discourse have been framed by a relatively 
circumscribed set of landmark Supreme Court cases. 
 72. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 73. Id. at 30 (explaining that sixty-four percent of dwellings in the area at issue were 
beyond repair). In the era of post-War urban renewal, Berman was a legal outlier, in that the 
statute at issue—the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-592, 
60 Stat. 790 (1946) (codified at D.C. Code §§ 5-701 to 5-719 (1973))—was actually federal, 
not local, given the then-direct oversight that Congress exercised over the District of 
Columbia. 
 74. 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
 75. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (2017). 
 76. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (noting 
that the relevant parcel for evaluating the claim was the “city tax block designated as the 
‘landmark site’”). Contra id. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the city had 
taken the appellees’ air rights). Grand Central Station had been developed as part of a much 
larger city-within-the-city, and the appropriate boundaries for evaluating the alleged 
regulatory constraints at issue in the case were not as intuitive as it might seem at first blush. 
 77. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 624 (1981) 
(rezoning to an agricultural category); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 257 (1980) 
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preservation,78 local environmental protection,79 rent control,80 and various  
other areas of local authority.81 Similarly, local governments are central 
players in those cases at the intersection of takings law and the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine involving challenges to conditions, or 
“exactions,” that are attached to development permits.82 
In sum, local governments are by no means the only domain for 
generating significant constitutional property cases, but they inarguably 
provide the central arena through which constitutional property frictions 
are resolved.83 
Although takings claims arise across the entire spectrum of property 
interests,84 it is a curious aspect of the doctrine that the regulatory realm 
that is most local in nature—land use—seems to generate more claims 
than other regulatory regimes. It is hard to say exactly why, but perhaps 
there is a psychology to the tangible nature of the kinds of real property 
and land-related regulatory regimes that tend to generate constitutional 
property frictions at the local level.85 There is also the logic—somewhat 
                                                                                                                           
(density restrictions); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 604–05 (1927) (building set-back 
ordinance); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915) (prohibition on brickyards); 
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 103 (1909) (height limitation). 
 78. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107–15. 
 79. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 590 (1962) (reviewing a 
town ordinance regulating sand and gravel dredging and pit excavating). 
 80. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (reviewing a rent 
control ordinance applicable to mobile homes); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1921) 
(reviewing a law requiring that existing tenancies continue after lease expiration in certain 
contexts). 
 81. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 
(1982) (reviewing a law requiring the installation of cable facilities). 
 82. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599, 601–02 
(2013) (concerning the denial of a land-use permit after the applicant refused to consent 
to proposed wetland mitigation conditions); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 
(1994) (concerning land-use permit conditions related to flood control and traffic improve-
ments); see also Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231, 1231 (1994), remanded to 911 
P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (concerning land-use permit conditions related to public recreational 
facilities and art, with the U.S. Supreme Court vacating and remanding in light of Dolan). 
 83. Local governments have also figured prominently in the two best-known cases 
involving the exhaustion of claims in the takings context. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. 
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186–94 (1985) (holding that the 
takings issue was not ripe before exhausting available administrative procedures); see also 
Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019) (overruling Williamson County). 
 84. Claimants raise Takings Clause challenges to interference with everything from 
personal property to intellectual property to more conceptually esoteric interests, such as 
federal fishing licenses and taxi medallions. See Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 
92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 916 (2016) (“[R]egulatory property . . . includes such assets as 
pollution credits, fishing quotas, taxi medallions, financial guarantees, and the 
telecommunications spectrum, among many others.”); Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic 
Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab Medallions, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 125, 137–39 
(2013) (discussing whether taxicab medallions are property under the Takings Clause). 
 85. This could also help explain why so many claims against states seem to involve 
environmental limitations on real property. 
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circular, but real nonetheless—that the Supreme Court has signaled 
greater solicitude for real property, implicitly relegating personal and 
intangible property to a more peripheral status in takings jurisprudence.86 
That solicitude shapes expectations, which in turn can shape the kinds of 
claims owners feel entitled to bring.87 
*    *    * 
Property paradigmatically allows owners to plan securely in a system 
that protects their reasonable expectations over time, but communities 
must also retain the ability to adjust the terms of ownership in response to 
changing social and economic exigencies. Takings law helps to manage 
that tension, but in doing so, raises fundamental questions about how to 
strike the right balance. The discourse on takings federalism answers those 
questions by emphasizing the state political process in defining the 
boundaries of constitutional property. 
Many of the most iconic cases that have come to define the juris-
prudence, however, have involved local governments. It is clear that local 
government regulatory authority—and broader action in domains such as 
condemnation for urban renewal and infrastructure—have put that level 
of government at the heart of takings. Regardless of whether the deference 
the Supreme Court has shown to state and local political processes is 
warranted, that deference is thus not merely a question of federalism. 
Rather, it is also a question of localism: how to allocate authority (in this 
instance over the boundaries of property rights) within the states? In the 
modern era of takings jurisprudence, state legislatures have not been 
passive on that question, as Part II explains. 
II. THE STATE–LOCAL DYNAMIC IN TAKINGS LAW 
As Part I highlighted, the jurisprudence of the Takings Clause extends 
great deference to property redefinitions reached through state and local 
democratic processes. Beneath this takings federalism lies the question of 
how to allocate authority to delineate the contours of property interests 
between these subfederal levels of government. This Part turns to the 
                                                                                                                           
 86. See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for 
Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 Ecology L.Q. 227, 234–46 (2004) 
(documenting the distinctions often drawn between real and personal property across 
takings jurisprudence). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Horne v. Department of 
Agriculture can be interpreted to moderate the Court’s prior support for this distinction, 
though the breadth or narrowness of the class of takings disputes to which Horne applies is 
not yet evident. See 57 U.S. 350, 357–58 (2015) (discussing the direct appropriation of 
personal property rather than regulation on the use of that property). 
 87. See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings 
Doctrine, 22 Ecology L.Q. 89, 127–28 (1995) [hereinafter Byrne, Ten Arguments] (noting 
that landowners raising takings challenges stand a greater chance of prevailing than owners 
of personal property); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine 
and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 605, 653 (1996) (same). 
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state–local interplay on key touchpoints in the development of con-
stitutional property law.88 Despite case law that treats state and local levels 
of government with equal deference in takings cases, state legislatures have 
engaged in what can only be described as a broad, long-standing, and 
ongoing project of limiting local-government discretion in this space. 
Many state statutes directly and exclusively constrain local-government 
authority. Yet even where, as is often the case, property rights statutes 
facially apply to both local and state levels of government, many of the 
regulatory tools the statutes constrain—such as zoning, eminent domain, 
development moratoria, contiguous lot mergers, impact fees, and historic 
designation—are of the variety that only local governments would have 
any regular occasion to implement.89 Indeed, a vast portion of land-use 
regulation is local in nature; state and federal regulation of land uses 
complements this expansive body of local law only in relatively select 
contexts, perhaps most prominently in environmental protection and 
antidiscrimination.90 Thus, even statutes that on their face apply to all 
governmental entities reflect burdens that are most acutely borne at the 
local level.91 
This Part organizes these statutory checks on local governments into 
four categories: liability expansions, procedural impositions, specific 
                                                                                                                           
 88. Property is, of course, a social institution in the sense that it regularly requires 
governmental entities to make choices in the face of conflicting claims to finite resources. 
See John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 339, 344–45 (1989) 
(“[L]egal property rights are shaped and limited by the many competing needs of the 
general welfare.”); C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in Property: Mainstream 
and Critical Positions 1, 1 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (“The actual institution [of 
property], and the way people see it, . . . all change over time. The changes are related to 
changes in the purposes which society . . . expect[s] the institution of property to serve.”). 
These social choices define the content of the relationships—between taxpayers and their 
representatives, employers and employees, developers and consumers, landlords and 
tenants, creditors and debtors, neighbors vis-à-vis neighbors, etc.—that we collectively have 
decided reflect the values of our democracy, such as liberty, equality, due process, and free 
speech. Whether, why, and how we might turn to local as opposed to state levels of 
government to exercise this decisional authority and, thereby, serve these fundamental 
values, are profound questions that sit at the heart of the U.S. legal system. This Article, 
though, concentrates on a specific set of property issues that are uniquely correlated with one 
particular—and particularly important—corner of law: constitutional takings 
jurisprudence. 
 89. See Robert Ellickson, Vicki L. Been, Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Christopher Serkin, 
Land Use Controls, at xxxvii (5th ed. 2021) (“Three basic players participate in the land use 
‘game’—landowners/developers, neighbors, and governments (usually local ones).”). 
 90. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983, 
985 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming the designation of 850,000 acres of land as critical habitat for 
endangered species on which development would be severely restricted in accordance with 
a federal environmental statute); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 
276 (Alaska 1994) (enforcing a state statute prohibiting landlords from discriminating 
against prospective tenants on the basis of marital status). 
 91. This Part notes a few outlier property rights statutes that pertain as much to state 
authority as to local authority. 
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limitations, and property owner empowerments. Liability expansions 
include those legislative efforts that aim to increase the likelihood—
relative to takings jurisprudence’s baseline—that a claimant will be 
awarded compensation as a result of alleged regulatory interferences with 
property rights. Procedural impositions create costly administrative 
hurdles that preemptively aim to discourage the adoption of regulations 
that might amount to takings in the first place. Specific limitations 
preempt or constrain the use of particular regulatory tools outright. And 
while property owner empowerments do not directly restrict the exercise 
of local regulatory authority, they equip landowners with tools to resist it. 
In these categories, there are some instances of causal connections 
between individual takings cases and legislative measures. The principal 
aim of this section, however, is not to hone in on such connections but to 
highlight the breadth of situations in which the categories of state 
legislation identified in this Article correlate with the local regulatory tools 
and approaches that have driven takings jurisprudence in so many 
important respects.92 
A.  Liability Expansions 
State legislatures have enacted various measures increasing the 
likelihood that claimants will be awarded compensation for alleged 
regulatory interference with their property rights. These measures either 
define the liability threshold more favorably to claimants than the 
threshold required by takings jurisprudence, or limit defenses available to 
government defendants in takings and related compensation cases.93 
1. Compensation Remedies. — As to the first approach, statutes in some 
states create a remedy of compensation—separate and apart from 
constitutional takings remedies—when regulation diminishes land value 
beyond a defined threshold94 or produces an “inordinate burden” on an 
                                                                                                                           
 92. Some scholars have argued that state takings legislation can be purely symbolic. 
See, e.g., Morriss, supra note 14, at 240 (arguing that some of the post-Kelo state legislative 
response imposed no significant substantive change in the exercise of eminent domain). 
That is contestable for much of the sweep of the legislation this Part surveys; even statutes 
designed to signal, however, can matter substantively in chilling the scope of legal responses. 
See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 93. Legislators unsuccessfully attempted to enact both forms at the federal level in the 
1990s. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings Legislation: Where It Stands and What Is Next, 23 Ecology 
L.Q. 509, 509–11 (1996). 
 94. See La. Stat. Ann. § 3:3610 (2019) (requiring compensation for prospective state 
and local regulations that reduce the market value of agricultural or forest lands by more 
than twenty percent of their preregulation value); Miss. Code Ann. § 49-33-7, -9 (2020) 
(requiring compensation for prospective state and local regulations that reduce the market 
value of agricultural or forest lands by more than forty percent of their preregulation value); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 195.305 (2019) (requiring compensation for prospective state and local 
regulations that reduce the market value of any property). The Oregon statute served to 
amend prior legislation adopted via a plebiscite that had generated billions of dollars in 
compensation claims as a result of its prospective and retroactive allocation. 1 Bill Bradbury, 
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individual claimant.95 For example, Mississippi law requires compensation 
upon the adoption of regulations that reduce the market value of 
                                                                                                                           
Off. of the Sec’y of State, Voters’ Pamphlet: State Measures 103–04 (2004), 
http://records.sos.state.or.us/ORSOSWebDrawer/RecordView/6873502 (on file with 
Columbia Law Review). A Texas statute requires compensation for prospective regulations 
affecting residential development and farming and forestry practices that reduce the market 
value of agricultural or forest lands by more than twenty-five percent of their preregulation 
value. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2007.002, .024 (2019). Peculiarly, however, municipalities are 
largely exempt from these strictures. Id. § 2007.003(a)–(b) (deeming municipal regulations 
subject to the statute only in those instances in which a municipal regulation impacts 
property owners within its extraterritorial jurisdiction but does not apply across the 
municipality’s entire extraterritorial jurisdiction). Legislators in a number of other states 
proposed but were unable to gain passage of diminution-in-value statutes. See H.R. 1054, 
2005–2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006); Private Property Protection Act, H.R. 663, 
121st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2003); An Act Relating to State and Municipal Regulatory 
Actions Relating to or Affecting Private Property; and Providing for an Effective Date, H.B. 
484, 22d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2002); Private Property Protection Act, H.R. 2773, 80th Leg., 
Continuing Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1998). In other states, voters rejected legislation of this nature 
through the initiative process. See 90 Government Acquisition, Regulation of Private 
Property: California Proposition 90, at 90–95, 187–89 (2006), https://repository.uchastings.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2257&context=ca_ballot_props [https://perma.cc/CR98-D227]; 
Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement of Vote, at xvii–xviii (2006), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ 
sov/2006-general/complete_sov.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K28-EWTF] (showing the defeat of 
Proposition 90 in the 2006 general election); see also 2006 Proposed Ballot Initiatives, Idaho 
Sec’y of State, https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/06init08.htm [https://perma.cc/2AM2-
DB5D] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020); November 7, 2006 General Election Results, Idaho Sec’y 
of State, https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/results/2006/general/tot_stwd.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
BRQ4-D58R] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (recording the defeat of Proposition 2 in the 2006 
general election). In still others, such initiatives never made it to the ballot in light of 
procedural illegalities. See Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rts., Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235, 
1245 (Nev. 2006) (holding that the Nevada Property Owners’ Bill of Rights Initiative 
violated the statutory single-subject requirements); In re Initiative Petition No. 382, 142 P.3d 
400, 402 (Okla. 2006) (holding that the Protect Our Homes Initiative violated the single-
issue rule by focusing on both eminent domain and regulatory takings); 2006 Initiative 
Petitions Approved for Circulation in Missouri: Constitutional Amendment to Article I—
Eminent Domain (version 2), Mo. Sec’y of State, https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/ 
2006petitions/ipEminentDomainI-36 [https://perma.cc/3H5L-WGQN] (last visited Oct. 
11, 2020); 2006 Ballot Issue I-154, Mont. Sec’y of State, https://sosmt.gov/elections/ 
ballot_issues/2006-2/i-154 [https://perma.cc/U6XZ-D2ZS] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020); Title 
Board Results: Proposed Initiative 2005–2006 #86, Colo. Sec’y of State, 
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/results/2005-2006/ 
result86-0506.html [https://perma.cc/8EKZ-RS7Z] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020). 
 95. See Fla. Stat. § 70.001 (2020) (requiring compensation for prospective state and 
local regulations that “inordinately burden” any property). An “inordinate burden” is 
defined as government action that 
directly restrict[s] or limit[s] the use of real property such that the 
property owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, 
investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real property or 
a vested right to a specific use of the real property with respect to the real 
property as a whole, or that the property owner is left with existing or 
vested uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears 
permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good 
of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large. 
Id. § 70.001(3)(e). 
238 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:215 
agricultural lands by more than forty percent of their preregulation 
value.96 
In their best light, these statutes developed out of a view that litigating 
constitutional takings claims is often too costly, time-consuming, and 
unpredictable, and even where takings outcomes are predictable, those 
outcomes are unprincipled and insufficiently protective of property 
rights.97 The foundation for this perspective commonly rests with the 
Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Penn Central, which identified a 
nonexclusive list of considerations that are relevant to a court’s 
determination in an individual takings case as to whether an imposition 
stemming from a new regulatory safeguard or obligation is fair and just, 
absent compensation.98 Interestingly, these compensation statutes 
originally arose in the years following several Supreme Court decisions 
that carved out instances in which Penn Central’s “ad hocery” did not 
apply.99 Perhaps proponents of these statutes saw momentum and 
guidance in these decisions;100 or perhaps, instead, they saw these 
supposedly “bright-line” takings decisions as too limited in scope.101 
Supporters claim that the clearer—indeed, categorical—standards set 
out in property rights statutes force government entities, via the fiscal 
pressure of a compensation remedy, to better account for the costs of 
                                                                                                                           
 96. Miss. Code Ann. § 49-33-1 to -17. 
 97. See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 14, at 220 (suggesting that advocacy for compensation 
statutes and takings impact assessment statutes arose out of a perception of “growing 
government regulation” and “dissatisfaction with the current state of constitutional takings 
law”). 
 98. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24, 130–31 (1978) 
(identifying “economic impact,” interference with “distinct investment-backed expectations,” 
and “the character of the governmental action” as relevant considerations). 
 99. The peak period of the compensation-statute movement came in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. In this period, the Supreme Court subjected at least some permit conditions 
and all regulations that eliminate economically available uses to more probing levels of 
scrutiny than Penn Central commands. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) 
(placing the burden of proof on the government, as the defendant in a takings case, to 
prove that a condition attached to a development permit is in “rough proportionality” with 
the approved development’s anticipated impacts); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1015–16 (1992) (declaring that regulations that deprive land of all economically 
valuable uses generally trigger takings liability); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825, 837 (1987) (placing the burden of proof on the government, as the defendant in a 
takings case, to prove that a condition attached to a development permit bore an “essential 
nexus” to the approved development’s anticipated impacts). 
 100. See, e.g., William A. Van Vactor, Jr., Note, The Backlash to Land Use Regulation 
Continues: An Analysis of Oregon’s Measure 37, 26 J. Land, Res. & Env’t L. 221, 222–24 
(2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Commission galvanized proponents of compensation statutes). 
 101. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of 
Expectations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1369, 1369–70 (1993) (describing Lucas as “something of a 
high water mark in takings jurisprudence” but declaring the Court’s attempt to distinguish 
between total and partial takings as “so rickety that it must fall under its own weight”). 
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regulatory programs.102 This accountability, the argument continues, 
promotes more transparent, cost-conscious choices about which potential 
regulations to adopt and which to forego.103 With these measures, then, 
state legislatures sought to create a regulatory environment more 
favorable to property owners fearful of interference with existing property 
rights than the politically deferential model under extant judicial 
interpretations of the Takings Clause.104 
These statutes pursue this goal through two general means. First, the 
bulk of these statutes create liability structures that rest solely on the lost 
value generated by regulation.105 This shifts the focus from a broad inquiry 
that accounts for the extent to which regulation prevents conduct that 
burdens other properties and the community at large,106 to a narrow 
                                                                                                                           
 102. See Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from 
the Oregon Experiment, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1281, 1284 (2009) (describing the evidence 
for and against the claim that governments will consider regulatory costs if subjected to 
compensation requirements for the impairment of property values). 
 103. In the face of critiques that property rights legislation would bankrupt local 
governments, supporters asserted that these statutes would actually impose very few costs 
because government entities would avoid having to make payments by adopting a more 
limited set of regulations. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Porter, Will Property Rights Legislation 
Endanger Smart Growth Efforts?, 30 Real Est. L.J. 275, 299–302 (2002) (“If legislators know 
that the cost [of regulations] will be borne by state and local governments, they have an 
incentive to make the regulation as focused and limited as it can be . . . .”). 
 104. Critics contend that such statutes fail to acknowledge the many benefits regulation 
confers, thereby effectively requiring government entities to pay landowners not to harm 
others via pollution, wetland degradation, and the like. See, e.g., Berger, The Illusion, supra 
note 37, at 11, 40. The extensive costs of doing so will, in turn, create a chilling effect to 
regulation that resultantly leaves the lands of those downwind/downstream/downslope in 
harm’s way. See id. at 34–37 (“Full compensation requirements do not lead to more efficient 
regulations; they simply shut regulation down.”); Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 
14, at 444 (“The virtually invariable effect of successful state takings legislation has been to 
force state and local governments to not adopt laws and regulations they otherwise would 
have adopted and to not enforce restrictions already on the books.”); Sugameli, supra note 
14, at 579–80 (“Provisions . . . that mandate that payments will come out of the budget of 
the agency . . . provide a powerful incentive for agencies to grant permits that will harm the 
health, safety and property of neighbors . . . .”). But see Daniel H. Cole, Political 
Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15 
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 141, 177–78 (2007) (“It is not clear . . . whether (and to what extent) 
the existence of these takings statutes has induced state and local governments to reduce 
regulatory impositions in order to avoid liability for compensation . . . .”). 
 105. Florida’s law is the exception in that it focuses less on the diminution in value than 
it does on the extent to which the claimant’s investment expectations have been dashed. 
See Fla. Stat. § 70.001(3)(e) (2020). Still, any award under Florida’s statute seeks to bridge 
the difference in value between the value of the property with and without the regulation 
creating the “inordinate burden.” Id. § 70.001(6)(b). 
 106. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for 
S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (rejecting diminution in value as a dispositive variable in a 
regulatory takings case). The lone exception in Supreme Court takings jurisprudence 
involves those instances in which regulation denies all economically viable uses of a parcel 
of land and thereby reduces the value of that parcel to zero. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–20, 1030 (1992). This “exception” is subject to its own 
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inquiry focused exclusively on the economic burdens of regulation. 
Second, these statutes dissolve the traditional takings claimant’s burden  
to prove that the government is not justified in proceeding absent 
compensation and instead impose the burden on government defendants 
to prove that they are so justified.107 This burden, according to a recent 
empirical study, falls heavily on local governments, who serve as the 
defendant in a far higher percentage of regulatory takings cases than their 
state counterparts.108 
That such statutes constrain land-use regulation—either through 
explicit application or by creating a chilling effect—is self-evident,109 
                                                                                                                           
qualifications and, thus, has hardly been applied categorically. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, 
Property-as-Society, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 911, 953–54 [hereinafter Mulvaney, Property-As-
Society] (“[T]he Murr Court described Lucas as merely offering ‘guidelines’ relevant to 
‘determining when government regulation is so onerous that it constitutes a taking.’” 
(quoting Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017))). 
 107. But these statutes often allow the government to repeal or modify its proposed 
action to avoid the compensation requirement. Therefore, only if a government action 
amounted to a taking under the Constitution (not merely the statute) would compensation 
be appropriate for the interim period during which the regulation was in effect before the 
government withdrew it, in accord with the Supreme Court’s temporary takings 
jurisprudence. See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“[W]here the government’s activities have already 
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve 
it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was 
effective.”). 
 108. Professors Krier and Sterk recently conducted an exhaustive empirical assessment 
of the more than 2,000 reported takings decisions handed down in the lower courts between 
1978 and 2012. Krier & Sterk, supra note 9. Of the approximately 1,200 reported cases in 
which a property owner challenged a regulation as a taking (excluding takings challenges 
to regulations designed to prevent against flooding, which the researchers addressed 
separately), nearly 900 involved claims against local government entities, while fewer than 
300 involved claims against state government entities in federal courts. Id. at 71 tbl.5, 78 
tbl.8. The small remainder involved claims against federal government entities. Id. at 78 tbl.8. 
 109. In terms of explicit applications, for example, before Oregon’s voters substantially 
reduced the impact of Measure 37 through another ballot initiative three years after the 
measure’s passage in 2004, more than 7,000 claims had been filed against state and county 
governments seeking a total of $17 billion in compensation. See Or. Dep’t of Land & 
Conservation Dev., Ballot Measures 37 (2004) and 49 (2007) Outcomes and Effects 5 (2011), 
https://www.oregon.gov/lcd/Measure49/Documents/M49_BallotMeasures37_and_49_O
utcomesEffects_2011.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y5U-UNKA]. These local governments 
found no viable fiscal option but to forego enforcement of regulations on zoning, 
subdivision, farming and forestry practices, transportation, and the like that allegedly 
diminished property values. See Berger, The Illusion, supra note 37, at 34. That a statute 
has been applied in only a small number of instances, however—or even has not been 
applied in any instances at all, as has reportedly been the case with Mississippi’s forty percent 
diminution-in-value statute—is not necessarily evidence that the statute lacks substantive 
effect. See Miss. Code Ann. § 49-33-7, -9 (2020); Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 14, 
at 518 (noting Mississippi’s forty percent diminution-in-value statute has never been 
litigated). Rather, the statute may well be doing its work by incentivizing regulators to avoid 
even approaching the forty-percent threshold and potentially triggering a claim for 
compensation. See Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 14, at 518 (noting the lack of 
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although this is made especially clear where statutes exempt government 
actions that provide relief from existing regulations. For example, under 
Florida’s statute, landowners cannot claim compensation on the ground 
that the government’s granting of a variance to a neighbor triggered a 
reduction in the value of their property.110 Given the overall size of local-
government budgets and the relatively more limited avenues by which they 
can raise revenues, local entities in all but perhaps the nation’s largest 
cities are more fiscally risk averse than their state-level counterparts.111 For 
this reason, any chilling effect resulting from compensation statutes is 
considerably more pronounced at the local level. Academic disagreement 
regarding these statutes centers not on whether they impose a chilling 
effect on local land-use regulation but rather on how extensive that effect 
might be.112 
                                                                                                                           
litigation “is probably in part because Mississippi has never pursued strict regulations of 
farm and agricultural lands”); see also supra note 104. 
 110. Fla. Stat. § 70.001(3)(e). On the possibility of nonenforcement of existing 
regulations giving rise to takings liability, see Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, supra 
note 61, at 185. 
 111. See Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1665–70. This Article assumes that 
democratic measures hold government officials to some account for their budgetary 
management. It does not contend, however, that monetary costs are always wholly 
commensurate with political costs. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain 
Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 994–95 (noting that it is not “realistic to think that higher 
levels of compensation will necessarily dissuade governmental entities from succumbing to 
political pressures” because the “pain from budgetary outlays” is “attenuated by the 
operation of the political process”); Levinson, supra note 37, at 346–47 (discussing how any 
model of the interaction between monetary and political costs is “highly contextual, 
complex, and controversial”); Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1644–65 
(explaining that local governments may exhibit a stronger relationship between monetary 
and political costs “because the costs and benefits of local government actions are born[e] 
by the same people who control the political process”); Katrina Miriam Wyman, The 
Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 239, 246–48 (2007) (noting that 
monetary costs do not directly translate into political costs because “taxpayers, not 
government decision makers, pay the monetary costs of government decisions”). 
 112. Compare Charles C. Carter & John Taylor, Current Status of Property Rights 
Compensation Statutes, 35 Real Est. L.J. 405, 411 (2006) (presenting the argument that 
“Florida’s legislature wouldn’t have gone to so much trouble if all they meant to do was to 
make it a little easier for land owners to gain compensation”), with Richard Grosso & Robert 
Hartsell, Old McDonald Still Has a Farm: Agricultural Property Rights After the Veto of S.B. 
1712, 79 Fla. Bar J. 41, 44 (2005) (suggesting that Florida’s statute was “not intended to 
drastically affect Florida’s growth management or environmental laws”). In the face of 
claims for compensation, local governments almost universally agree to waive enforcement 
of the challenged regulation. See Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 14, at 488 (noting 
the local concern that paying compensation to a party allegedly burdened by a generally 
applicable regulation in one case would generate many more claims from owners subject to 
the same regulation). 
 Examples of local-government decisions to abandon proposed regulation or weaken 
existing regulation in the face of a threat of compensation claims under these statutes 
abound. See, e.g., id. at 462–69. While the actual impacts of these statutes have not been 
empirically assessed, they assuredly vary across the adopting jurisdictions in light of their 
distinctive backdrops. The statutes in Florida and Oregon, and similarly though to a lesser 
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2. Limitations on Takings Defenses. — Some state statutes increase the 
likelihood that claimants will be awarded compensation for alleged 
regulatory interference with property rights by limiting the defenses 
available to the government. In some instances, such limitations are 
explicit. Consider, for example, the takings defense that a regulation 
merely precludes a land use that could have been declared a nuisance at 
common law, as set out explicitly in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council 113 and underpinning a lengthy run of cases that preceded it.114 
State legislatures have limited this defense with ubiquitous “right-to-farm” 
statutes that excuse at least some agricultural activities from nuisance 
liability.115 In these circumstances, local governments are precluded from 
regulating the harmful impacts that farm operators can impose on their 
neighbors.116 
Like nuisance law, the customary use doctrine and the public trust 
doctrine have also shielded local governments from liability in numerous 
takings cases.117 But some state legislatures have narrowed the 
                                                                                                                           
extent in Arizona, were adopted against the backdrop of fairly extensive land-use regulatory 
programs. The statutes in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, on the other hand, were 
adopted in states that lack strong traditions of land-use regulation. 
 113. 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992). 
 114. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277–80 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394, 406 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915); Mugler 
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658, 667 (1887). 
 115. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 2-4-107 (2020) (“[A]n agricultural operation shall not 
be found to be a public or private nuisance if the agricultural operation alleged to be a 
nuisance employs methods or practices that are commonly or reasonably associated with 
agricultural production.”); Ga. Code Ann. § 41-1-7 (2020) (“No agricultural facility . . . shall 
be or shall become a nuisance, either public or private, as a result of changed conditions in 
or around the locality of such facility or operation if the facility or operation has been in 
operation for one year or more.”); Miss. Code. Ann. § 95-3-29 (2020) (“In any nuisance 
action, public or private, against an agricultural operation, including forestry activity, proof 
that . . . [it] has existed for one (1) year or more is an absolute defense to the nuisance 
action . . . .”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5753 (2020) (creating a rebuttable presumption that 
agricultural activity is not a nuisance if it is consistent with good agricultural practices, is 
established prior to surrounding nonagricultural activities, has not significantly changed 
since commencement of surrounding activities, and complies with other applicable law). 
The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors ex rel. Kossuth County 
presents the rare exception calling these statutes into question absent takings 
compensation. See 584 N.W.2d 309, 319–22 (Iowa 1998) (declaring that, by licensing one 
landowner’s creation of a nuisance, the county effectively transferred to that landowner a 
property interest in the form of an easement across a neighbor’s land and finding that such 
a transfer is the proper subject of takings review). 
 116. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Beidel, Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Farm Law: A Relief for Farmers 
or an Unconstitutional Taking?, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 163, 171 (2005) (“The law limits the 
ability of municipalities to create local ordinances that define ‘normal agricultural operations’ 
as public nuisances.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that a Washington land owner did not hold a compensable property interest 
in his proposal to build private residences on elevated platforms above navigable tidelands 
because the construction’s purpose “was inconsistent with the public trust that the State . . . 
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circumstances in which the government can assert that a regulation 
supporting public access to beaches preserves a customary use,118 while 
others have considered eliminating altogether the defense that a 
challenged regulation protects property held in trust for the public.119 
In other instances, state legislation walks back available takings 
defenses in more subtle ways. For example, a number of state property 
rights statutes exempt regulations enacted to protect public “health and 
safety.”120 In so doing, they silently omit the more capacious, traditional 
takings defense that a regulation serves the public welfare by precluding 
detrimental and often localized impacts that are less directly connected to 
public health and safety. These impacts include the often diffused harms 
that odors, noise, pollution, and the like can impose on natural 
resources;121 development designs that run counter to the aesthetic 
desirability and cohesion of neighborhoods;122 and degradation of 
communities’ cultural and historic character.123 
                                                                                                                           
is obligated to protect”); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456–57 (Or. 1993) 
(“We . . . hold the doctrine of custom as applied to public use of Oregon’s dry sand areas is 
one of ‘the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property . . . already 
place upon land ownership.’ . . . [P]laintiffs have never had the property interests that they 
claim were taken . . . .” (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992))). 
 118. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 163.035 (2020) (requiring that the government, before 
adopting a beach access regulation on the grounds that it preserves a customary recreational 
public use, provide notice of a public hearing at which it bears the burden of proving that 
the use has been “ancient, reasonable, without interruption, and free from dispute”). 
 119. See, e.g., H.R. 597, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(8) (Mont. 1995) (“The public trust 
doctrine is specifically excluded as a defense of any taking of private property or real 
property by private persons or public agencies.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1134(B)(1) (2020) (exempting from diminution-in-
value remedies those “land use laws that . . . [l]imit or prohibit a use or division of real 
property for the protection of the public’s health and safety”); Miss. Code Ann. § 49-33-
7(e)–(f) (exempting from diminution-in-value remedies regulations that restrict activities 
that “constitute a public nuisance under common law” or are “harmful to the public health 
and safety”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 195.305(3)(a)–(b) (2019) (exempting from diminution-in-
value remedies regulations that restrict activities “commonly and historically recognized as 
public nuisances under common law” or that otherwise were enacted “for the protection of 
public health and safety”). 
 121. See, e.g., R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 298 (Alaska 2001) 
(rejecting a takings challenge to a setback requirement that was part of a wetlands protection 
scheme due to “the unique ecological and economic value that wetlands provide in protecting 
water quality, regulating local hydrology, preventing flooding, and preventing erosion”). 
 122. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (open space); Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396–97 (1926) (zoning); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 
107–08 (1909) (building height limitation); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 
(1887) (“A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by 
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in 
any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 123. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (noting, 
in rejecting a takings claim, that New York City’s historical landmark designations were 
“substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare”); id. at 145–46 (Rehnquist, J., 
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B.  Procedural Impositions 
Unlike the statutes discussed in the prior section, the legislation 
reviewed in this section does not affect the standard employed to deter- 
mine whether a regulation requires compensation or the defenses available  
against such a claim. Instead, these statutes create costly procedural 
requirements that preemptively aim to discourage the adoption of 
regulations that might amount to takings in the first place. 
In several states, legislation requires local-government entities to 
perform a “takings impact assessment” before deciding whether to adopt 
a land-use regulation.124 While the details vary from state to state, such 
assessments generally require the government to prepare, within a matter 
of weeks, a written analysis responding to a series of what are, at times, 
data-dependent questions respecting individual properties that would 
potentially be subject to the regulation under consideration.125 These 
statutes, again seen in their best light, aim to minimize interference with 
property rights by forcing the government to prospectively consider the 
future impacts of proposed regulations on property rights.126 In turn, the 
                                                                                                                           
dissenting) (“Appellees are not prohibiting a nuisance. The record is clear that the 
proposed addition . . . would be in full compliance with zoning, height limitations, and 
other health and safety requirements. Instead, appellees are seeking to preserve what they 
believe to be an outstanding example of beaux arts architecture.”). 
 124. See Idaho Code § 67-8003 (2020) (requiring a takings impact assessment upon 
written request of the private property owner); Tex. Gov’t Code § 2007.043 (2019) 
(requiring a takings impact assessment only in select circumstances); Utah Code § 63L-3-
202 (2009); Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.370 (2020). Other states passed legislation that 
seemingly—and somewhat peculiarly, given the reality that so much of land-use regulation 
occurs at the local level—only require state government entities to conduct takings impact 
assessments. See Del. Code tit. 29, § 605 (2020); Ind. Code § 4-22-2-32 (2020); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 77-704 (West 2020); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 8056(1)(a), (6) (2020); Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 24.424 (West 2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.017 (West 2020); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 2-10-105 (West 2019); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-09 (2020); Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-1-203 
(2020); Va. Code § 25.1-417 (2020); W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-1A-3 (LexisNexis 2020); Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 9-5-303 (2020). Meanwhile, California, Colorado, and Nebraska did so by 
following Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 15, 1988), which outlines 
requirements for federal departments and agencies to follow when they act in a way  
that might constitute a taking. Cal. Exec. Order No. D-77-89 (June 22, 1989), https:// 
www.library.ca.gov/Content/pdf/GovernmentPublications/executive-order-proclamation/ 
5949-5950.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2LX-HS5M]; Neb. Exec. Order No. 95-9 (June 3, 1998), 
https://govdocs.nebraska.gov/docs/pilot/pubs/eofiles/95-9.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review); Gus Bauman, Supreme Court Takings Rule, SC43 ALI-ABA 91, 99 (1998). 
Many takings impact assessment bills moved forward as political compromises after 
diminution-in-value compensation bills did not garner sufficient support. See Robert Meltz, 
Property Rights Legislation: Analysis and Update, SB14 ALI-ABA 551, 570 (1996). 
 125. See, e.g., Idaho Att’y Gen. Off., Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines 5 (2020), 
https://www.ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/RegulatoryTakings.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Q53Z-29P7] (noting that the completed takings analysis shall be provided no 
more than forty-two days after a filed request). 
 126. See, e.g., Marzulla, supra note 14, at 636 (“Planning bills merely require state 
agencies to assess the takings implications of their regulations before they are adopted.”); 
Michael M. Berger, Dollars and Damages: A Debate, Planning, Mar. 1996, at 22, 24 (“[W]hat 
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argument goes, these assessments help the government avoid inadvertent 
takings and protect the public fisc.127 In other states, government entities 
are encouraged and, in select instances, even required to engage in 
settlement discussions upon property owners’ claims that a regulatory 
action interferes with their preferred land uses.128 
In the face of heightened fiscal pressures facing local governments,129 
takings impact assessments and mandatory-settlement statutes may well 
have the effect of chilling even those local regulatory efforts that are 
extremely unlikely to broach the takings liability line.130 The cost of 
completing takings impact assessments is extensive.131 An analysis of 
Washington State’s takings impact assessment statute—which the state’s 
voters repealed via referenda before it was implemented—estimated that 
state and local entities would collectively sustain annual costs ranging  
                                                                                                                           
the pending legislation is designed to do is to force society to examine the true cost of its 
programs . . . .”). Opponents, meanwhile, see an assessment statute as “red tape” that 
demands expensive speculation that cannot achieve the stated aim, given the challenges 
inherent in determining via a facial analysis the likelihood that a generally applicable law 
will be unfair and unjust to an individual claimant absent compensation. See, e.g., Byrne, 
Ten Arguments, supra note 87, at 137–38 (arguing that property assessment statutes have 
little benefit in terms of protecting property rights because agencies are not equipped to 
“rationally consider whether a proposed regulation will effect a taking on any piece of 
property”); Cordes, supra note 14, at 241 (“[I]t is questionable whether the marginal 
benefits of such assessments will be worth the considerable effort of their preparation.”); 
Marilyn F. Drees, Do State Legislatures Have a Role in Resolving the “Just Compensation” 
Dilemma? Some Lessons from Public Choice and Positive Political Theory, 66 Fordham L. 
Rev. 787, 814 n.168 (1997) (arguing that assessment requirements that rely on facial 
assessments are unlikely to “weed out a great number of regulations” because they cannot 
show harm to every affected person); Freilich & Doyle, supra note 14, at 4–6 (“[A]ssessment 
type takings laws could not accomplish anything more than creating a huge expense and 
chilling the efforts of state agencies and local governments charged to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of our communities.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 127. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the 
Property Rights Movement, 1 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 77, 120–21 (2002) (“[Takings impact 
assessment] statutes are broadly beneficial in the sense that they force agencies and 
attorneys general to give at least some thought to property rights and the takings issue.”). 
 128. See Fla. Stat. § 70.001(1), (4)(c) (2020) (requiring the government to “make a 
written settlement offer” within a specified period following a property owner’s filing a claim 
that “a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance . . . unfairly affects real property”); Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3341(3) (allowing a landowner to “apply for mediation” if the landowner 
believes they have “suffered significant harm as a result of a [local] governmental action 
regulating land use” and have “pursued all reasonable avenues of administrative appeal”). 
 129. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 130. See, e.g., Sugameli, supra note 14, at 573 (asserting that takings impact assessments 
“can incur high costs in time, effort and expense and can function, intentionally or not, to 
delay or block implementation of laws that protect people, property and communities”). 
 131. See S. Rep. No. 104-239, at 75 n.21 (1996) (“[T]he Congressional Budget Office 
and the Office of Management and Budget have estimated the cost of this [takings impact 
assessment] provision to be between $30 and $40 million over 5 years.”); Carol M. Rose, A 
Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 265, 288 (1996) (“At best, such overblown procedural requirements 
are simply wasteful . . . .”). 
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from $513 million to $2.3 billion in 1994 dollars to fulfill their assessment 
requirements.132 
The costs of mandatory-settlement discussions can also be significant. 
The government is at an “information asymmetry” in these discussions 
given that it is required to engage with each property claimant about the 
impact of a regulation on that claimant’s individual property—about which 
likely only that claimant is intimately familiar—even where that regulation 
applies generally to hundreds or even thousands of properties.133 Simply 
arranging such individualized discussions is an administratively expensive 
task,134 let alone the possibility of having to hire additional government 
personnel to acquire the background information needed to conduct 
these individualized discussions in any meaningfully thorough way. 
C.  Limitations on Specific Local-Government Powers 
The statutes in this section do not aim to chill land-use regulation 
substantively or procedurally, but instead preempt or constrain the use of 
specific local regulatory tools at the center of takings law outright. The 
legislation in this category includes provisions respecting eminent 
domain, lot-merger ordinances, development moratoria, impact fees, 
tenant protections and other housing policies, environmental preser-
vation, and zoning variances. Unsurprisingly, given the breadth of this 
range, the motivations behind and rationalizations for adopting these 
statutes vary considerably. In general, though, it is fair to suggest these 
statutes are rooted in the implicit assumption that local governments are 
wholly incapable of being channeled into making prudent, cost-conscious 
choices in these areas. 
1. Limitations on Eminent Domain Authority. — The first category of 
outright limitations on specific local-government powers involves eminent 
domain. These statutes are intimately tied up with takings jurisprudence, 
perhaps most notoriously after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City 
of New London.135 In Kelo, the Court concluded that condemnation of non-
blighted properties for economic redevelopment purposes is consistent 
with the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” clause.136 This holding prompted 
                                                                                                                           
 132. See Inst. for Pub. Pol’y & Mgmt., Univ. of Wash., Referendum 48—Economic 
Impact Study of the Property Rights Initiative 5 tbl.1, 6 tbl.3 (1995) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). In 2020 dollars, the cost would be approximately $892 million to $4 billion, 
according to calculations from the Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator of the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).  
 133. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Florida’s Property Rights Act: A Political Quick Fix 
Results in a Mixed Bag of Tricks, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 315, 389–91 (1995). 
 134. See id. at 388–89 (“[T]he land use entity must make a careful, individualized 
determination for each claim filed . . . . This personnel cost will have to be absorbed by the 
agency, since administrative costs of the Act are not funded.”). 
 135. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 136. Id. at 484. 
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dozens of state legislatures to pass statutes limiting eminent domain for 
economic development purposes.137 In some of these states, the restric-
tions are limited in that they continue to allow the taking of properties 
that fit a broadly worded definition of “blighted.”138 In others, though, the 
statutory measures are quite constraining. Some states partner their 
prohibitions on economic development takings with a narrowing of the 
definition of “blight”;139 others go so far as to prohibit economic 
development takings regardless of blight.140 
                                                                                                                           
 137. Among the plethora of law review articles recounting and assessing the state 
legislative responses to Kelo, careful contributions include: Ely, supra note 14, at 133–38 
(critically assessing post-Kelo statutes in light of expansive “blight” exemptions and “motive” 
requirements); Jacobs & Bassett, supra note 14, at 6–8 (arguing that state laws passed in 
response to Kelo have had little substantive impact, but may have heightened public 
awareness of takings); Mihaly & Smith, supra note 14, at 726–27 (noting, at the time of 
writing, that out of the forty states that enacted post-Kelo legislation, only fourteen state 
legislatures enacted laws that either banned or significantly restricted condemnation for 
economic development); Morriss, supra note 14, at 240–43 (offering explanations for the 
differing effectiveness of post-Kelo statues); Somin, Political Response to Kelo, supra note 14, 
at 2114–16 (categorizing post-Kelo legislative efforts as either effective or ineffective); 
Hannah Jacobs, Note, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings 
Initiatives, 116 Yale L.J. 1518, 1522–27 (2007) (surveying the regulatory takings reform 
movement and its success at the state level). 
 138. See Alaska Stat. §§ 09.55.240(a)(2), 18.55.950(2) (2020); Cal. Health & Safety 
Code §§ 33030–33037 (2020); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-25-103(2), 38-1-101(2)(b) (2020); 65 
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5 / 11-74.4-3(a)(1) (West 2019); Iowa Code § 6A.22 (2020); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 99.340(2), 99.370(6) (West 2020); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 816 (2020); Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 5101 (2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 100.310.2, 353.020.2, 523.271.2 
(West 2020); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-15-4206(2), 70-30-102 (West 2019); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 18-2103 (2012), 76-701 (2018); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 37.010(1)(o), 279.388 (2019); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. §§ 160A-503(2), 160A-515 (2020); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.08(B)(2)(a)-(p), 
303.26(E) (2007); 42 R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-64.12-6(d) (2020); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-31-6 
(2020); Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-201(a) (2020); Tex. Gov’t Code § 2206.001(b)(3) (2019); 
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 374.003(3) (2019); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1040 (2020); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 24, § 3201(3) (2019); W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 16-18-3(c)–(d), 16-18-6 (LexisNexis 2020); 
Wis. Stat. § 32.03(6)(a) (2020). Maryland law allows economic development and blight 
takings but requires that they be accomplished within four years of their authorization. See 
Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 12-105.1(a) (West 2020). Connecticut places a different 
though similarly limited constraint on the exercise of eminent domain by precluding its use 
in instances in which the condemnation would be “for the primary purpose of increasing 
local tax revenue.” See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-193(b)(1) (2020). 
 139. See Ala. Code § 24-2-2(c) (2020); Ga. Code Ann. § 22-1-1(1), (10) (2020); Idaho 
Code § 7-701A(2)(b) (2020); Ind. Code § 32-24-4.5-7 (2020); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 213.23(1), (3), (8) (West 2020); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 205:3-b (2020); Va. Code § 1-219.1 
(2020); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-801(c) (2020). The Pennsylvania legislature precluded economic 
development takings with a narrow definition of blight but included geographic exemptions 
for major urban areas. See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 203(b)(4), 204(a), 205(b)–(c) (2018). 
 140. See Fla. Stat. § 73.013(1), (4) (2020); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-18-10 (West 2020). These 
statutes largely mirror a Utah statute that had been enacted shortly before the Supreme 
Court released its decision in Kelo. See S.B. 184, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005) (repealed 
by H.B. 365, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2006)). Two other state legislatures have gone 
nearly as far. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 26-501b (2020) (precluding nearly all exercises of 
eminent domain that would be followed by a transfer to a nongovernmental third party); 
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2. Anti-Lot-Merger Laws. — The power to define lot-line boundaries is 
a second area of state intervention in specific local-government authority. 
In the recent Supreme Court case Murr v. Wisconsin, a landowner 
challenged a county regulation requiring the merger of commonly owned 
adjacent properties that, separately, are not sufficiently large under 
current zoning law to erect residential structures in light of flooding and 
other topographical risks.141 Consistent with the lower courts that had 
addressed earlier takings challenges to merger laws,142 the Court 
unanimously agreed that the county’s merger ordinance did not amount 
to a compensable taking of the claimant’s property.143 
Shortly after the Murr decision came down in 2017, the Wisconsin 
legislature passed a statute—effective retroactively—that preempts any law 
that requires lots to be merged without the owners’ consent.144 This course 
followed that of several state legislatures that had restricted local use of 
merger laws prior to Murr. Several of these pre-Murr antimerger laws 
directly mirror Wisconsin’s statute in important respects.145 Of the others, 
one state’s statute limits mergers to those instances involving local efforts 
to enforce setback requirements and subdivision standards,146 while 
several other states place similar, if less stringent, constraints on the 
application of merger laws.147 
                                                                                                                           
S.D. Codified Laws § 11-7-22.1(1) (2020) (precluding economic development takings and 
all takings—including in blighted areas—that would be followed by a transfer of the 
condemned interest to a nongovernmental third party). 
 141. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (2017). 
 142. See, e.g., Booth v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., Barrington, No. PC97-3515, 1999 WL 
566128, at *6–7 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 14, 1999); Mancino v. Purcell, No. 95-6007, 1997 WL 
1051036, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1997). 
 143. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946–49; id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that 
the majority’s conclusion that the merger ordinance did not affect a compensable taking 
“d[id] not trouble [him]”). The Justices were divided, though, on the appropriate approach 
for determining the baseline property interest at stake in a regulatory takings case. See 
Mulvaney, Property-As-Society, supra note 106, at 964–66. 
 144. Wis. Stat. § 66.10015(4) (2020). 
 145. New Hampshire’s statute most directly mirrors that of Wisconsin. See N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 674:39-a (2020) (“No city, town, county, or village district may merge preexisting 
subdivided lots or parcels except upon the consent of the owner.”). In Colorado, counties 
considering a merger of lots must afford the landowner the opportunity to request a hearing. 
Landowner consent is required for the merger to proceed only if the landlord requests a 
hearing. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-28-139(1)–(2) (2020). In effect, then, in all cases in Wisconsin 
and New Hampshire, the owner must give the government consent, whereas in Colorado, the 
owner must take the step of requesting a hearing to place that burden on the government. 
 146. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-6-9.1 (West 2020) (precluding counties from merging parcels 
considered separate in the chains of title prior to transfer into common ownership and 
where the common owner has “taken no action to consolidate the parcels” except “for the 
purpose of enforcing minimum zoning or subdivision standards”). 
 147. Cal. Gov’t Code § 66451.10–11 (2020) (precluding the application of local merger 
laws unless some combination of conditions relating to existing development, lot size, 
sewage and water service, slope stability, vehicular and safety equipment access, health and 
safety hazards, and comprehensive plan consistency are satisfied); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. 
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3. Development Moratoria Preemption. — Local governments at times 
impose moratoria on development in order to facilitate planning. By 
temporarily limiting growth, development moratoria provide officials with 
time and space to address their jurisdiction’s myriad community goals—
such as safeguarding sites of historic and cultural value, preserving open 
space and other environmental resources, and providing affordable 
housing—in a more coordinated and comprehensive fashion than they 
otherwise could.148 
The Supreme Court has determined that adjudicating takings 
challenges to these moratoria “requires careful examination and weighing 
of all the relevant circumstances” via the “Penn Central inquiry.”149 
Development moratoria, like merger ordinances, have consistently 
survived constitutional challenge under this standard.150 Many state 
legislatures, however, have capped the length of time that local 
governments may adopt development moratoria to periods as short as four 
months.151 
                                                                                                                           
§ 45-24-38 (2020) (requiring that the standards employed at the local level to determine 
whether a merger is appropriate must allow for consideration of infrastructure availability, 
neighborhood character, and comprehensive plan consistency); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, 
§ 4412(2)(B) (2020) (precluding the application of municipal merger laws where “the lots 
are conveyed in their preexisting, nonconforming configuration” and, prior to the effective 
date of the merger law, each lot was connected to an operable water supply and wastewater 
system). One state legislature uniquely constrains county government authority to adopt 
and apply merger laws by setting out criteria for those contiguous “shoreland” lots that local 
governments must merge. See Minn. Stat. § 394.36 (2019). 
 148. Robert Meltz, Dwight H. Merriam & Richard M. Frank, The Takings Issue: 
Constitutional Limits on Land Use Control and Environmental Regulation 264–65 (1999). 
 149. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 n.23, 
334 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). While the Supreme Court determined in First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles that the state cannot 
avoid having to pay compensation by repealing the offending law, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987), 
the California courts held on remand that an interim local ordinance precluding 
construction in a flood-prone area did not amount to a compensable “temporary” taking, 
First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 
893, 906 (Ct. App. 1989). In Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme Court later rejected a claimant’s 
contention that a thirty-two-month development moratorium should be deemed a taking of 
all economically viable uses regardless of any public interests advanced by the moratorium. 
See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320–21. 
 150. See, e.g., Wild Rice River Ests., Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 859 (N.D. 
2005); Nolen v. Newtown Twp., 854 A.2d 705, 709–10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004). 
 151. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-833(E) (2020) (120-day limit with one possible renewal); 
Cal. Gov’t. Code § 65858(a) (forty-five-day limit with up to a two-year extension); Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 30-28-121 (2020) (six months); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.201(1) (West 2020) (one 
year); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 4356(2) (2020) (180-day limit with one possible 
renewal); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 125.3404 (West 2020) (one-year limit with one possible 
renewal); Minn. Stat. § 394.34 (one-year limit with a possible two-year renewal); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 76-2-206(2) (West 2019) (one-year limit with one possible renewal); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 674:23(III)(c) (2020) (one year); Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.520(4) (2019) (120-day limit 
with up to a possible six-month renewal); S.D. Codified Laws § 11-2-10 (2020) (one-year limit 
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4. Impact-Fee Limitations. — Fees by local governments assessed to 
mitigate the impact of development constitute another area of state 
interference. Takings jurisprudence somewhat peculiarly saddles the 
government, as the defendant in takings cases, with the burden of proving 
that certain types of permit conditions are sufficiently connected to and 
roughly proportionate with the anticipated impacts stemming from the 
approved development to avoid liability.152 In turn, though, this means 
that in those many routine instances in which this burden either is met or 
is considered inapplicable to the type of permit condition at issue, takings 
liability is inapposite.153 One approach to offset development impacts—
particularly those that are cumulative in nature, such as stresses on local 
schools, roadways, and traffic patterns—involves conditioning development 
permits on the requirement that the applicant pay impact or “linkage” fees 
that the local government pools.154 
Some state legislatures, however, have precluded impact fees outright 
in certain circumstances,155 and many others have placed stringent 
limitations on their use even in cases in which the government would have 
little difficulty demonstrating that the fees meet the connectivity and 
proportionality strictures of takings law were it required to do so.156 
                                                                                                                           
with one possible renewal); Utah Code § 10-9a-504 (2005) (six-month limit with a possible 
eighteen-month renewal); Wash. Rev. Code § 35A.63.220 (2020) (six-month limit with 
possible unlimited renewals); Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(da) (2020) (two-year limit with a possible 
one-year renewal). New Jersey precludes development moratoria for the purpose of 
preparing a comprehensive plan or drafting development regulations, though they are 
authorized for up to six months “where the municipality demonstrates on the basis of a 
written opinion by a qualified health professional that a clear imminent danger to the health 
of the inhabitants of the municipality exists.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-90(b) (West 2020). 
 152. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“rough proportionality”); 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“essential nexus”). 
 153. There is general agreement that the nexus and proportionality standards apply 
when the state issues or proposes a land-use permit administratively conditioned on 
applicants providing strangers permanent access to their land or drawing on a “specific 
pool” of the applicants’ money. The lower courts are divided, however, on the question of 
whether these standards apply in the various other contexts involving conditional permits 
(situations in which permit conditions are unrelated to access by strangers or a specific pool 
of funds, situations in which permit conditions are required by broadly applicable 
regulation, etc.). For a recent exploration of the topic of when courts apply the heightened 
scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan and how restraint in its application stems from normative 
concerns regarding fair allocation, see generally Timothy M. Mulvaney, The State of 
Exactions, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 169 (2019) [hereinafter Mulvaney, State of Exactions]. 
 154. See William W. Merrill III & Robert K. Lincoln, Linkage Fees and Fair Share 
Regulations: Law and Method, 25 Urb. Law. 223, 234–37 (1993) (explaining how linkage 
fees are formulated to be proportional to the development’s impact). 
 155. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-463.05(B)(5) (prohibiting development fees for 
construction or repair for public facilities and associated operation costs); Del. Code tit. 14, 
§ 2006(b) (2020) (precluding impact fees for improving water supply or wastewater 
capacity); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-8-5 (West 2020) (prohibiting impact fees for construction or 
repair of public facilities, operating costs of a municipality, and debt payments). 
 156. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-463.05(A) (allowing municipalities to assess development 
fees to offset costs for necessary public services); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-103(b) (2020) 
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5. Preemption of Tenant Protections and Other Local Housing Policies. — 
Rent control and related tenant protections have often survived takings 
challenges where they assure landlords a reasonable rate of return on their 
investment under the circumstances. A century ago, in Block v. Hirsh, the 
Supreme Court rejected a takings challenge to a law that, in the face of a 
housing shortage, allowed tenants to retain possession of their units after 
the end of their leases at rents determined by a government commission.157 
The Court reaffirmed Block seventy years later in holding that a law 
allowing mobile home owners to continue renting the land on which their 
mobile homes sat after the termination of the lease term did not amount 
to a categorically compensable regulation authorizing an unwanted 
physical invasion by a stranger.158 Consequently, lower courts almost 
                                                                                                                           
(allowing municipalities to assess impact fees to offset costs for necessary public facilities); 
Cal. Gov’t Code § 66001 (establishing requirements for any imposed development fee by a 
local agency); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-20-104(2)(c) (allowing a local government to impose an 
impact fee); Del. Code tit. 29, § 9124 (allowing a county government to establish an impact 
fee for services for which the county will bear increased costs of development); Fla. Stat. 
§ 163.31801 (2020) (establishing minimum requirements for impact fees by a municipality); 
Ga. Code Ann. § 36-71-3 (2020) (authorizing municipalities and counties to impose 
development impact fees); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-142 (2020) (allowing impact fees to be 
assessed); Idaho Code § 67-8204 (2020) (allowing government entities to impose 
development impact fees as a condition of development); 605 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-904 
(West 2020) (establishing requirements for any impact fee by a local government); Ind. 
Code § 36-7-4-1311 (2020) (allowing local units to impose an impact fee); La. Stat. Ann. 
§ 33:3091 (2019) (establishing requirements for impact fees); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-a, 
§ 4354 (establishing requirements for impact fees); Md. Code Ann., Loc. Gov’t § 5-102 
(West 2020) (requiring that impact fees have a “rational nexus” to the project); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 7-6-1602 (establishing requirements for impact fees); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 278B.160 
(2019) (allowing a local government to impose an impact fee); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 674:21 
(requiring an impact fee to be proportional to the improvement costs); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-
8-3 (prohibiting municipalities or counties from enacting impact fees unless specifically 
authorized); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162A-203 (2020) (establishing limits on impact fees); Okla. 
Stat. tit. 62, § 895 (2020) (limiting development fees to public infrastructure expansion); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.302 (authorizing “system development charges”); 53 Pa. Stat. § 10503-
A (West 2020) (authorizing only transportation fees); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-22.4-3 (2020) 
(establishing requirements for impact fees); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-2902 (2020) (allowing 
funding for schools in high growth areas by taxing residential developments); Tex. Loc. 
Gov’t Code § 395.011–395.012 (2019) (prohibiting government entities from imposing 
impact fee unless specifically authorized); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, §§ 5200, 5202, 5204 (2020) 
(limiting impact fees to the “proportionate share” of a development’s cost); Va. Code § 15.2-
2319 (2020) (allowing localities to impose impact fees for the cost of reasonable road 
improvements); Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.060 (establishing requirements for impact fees); 
W. Va. Code Ann. § 7-20-7 (LexisNexis 2020) (limiting impact fees to the “proportionate 
share” of any realized benefit); Wis. Stat. § 66.0617 (allowing a municipality to impose an 
impact fee to pay for necessary land development costs). Select states require takings impact 
assessments—described above in the context of generally applicable regulations—before 
conditioning a permit on the dedication of a property interest. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 24.424; Utah Code § 11-36a-201 to -202. 
 157. 256 U.S. 135, 157–58 (1921). 
 158. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 539 (1992). 
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universally reject Penn Central claims in this context.159 But at least twenty-
nine states preempt rent control ordinances.160 Relatedly, in two states, 
state legislatures have preempted local governments from enacting 
ordinances that preclude landlords from discriminating against pro-
spective tenants on the grounds that they hold government-provided 
housing vouchers.161 
In this same vein, some local governments have sought to combat 
housing-affordability crises by turning to inclusionary zoning ordinances. 
These ordinances condition residential development permits on appli-
cants ensuring that permitted development will include a share of units 
that are affordable for low-income families.162 The lower courts have 
rejected takings challenges to such ordinances,163 and the Supreme Court 
has denied numerous petitions for writs of certiorari raising the issue.164 A 
number of state legislatures, however, have precluded local governments 
                                                                                                                           
 159. See, e.g., Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010); Yee 
v. City of Escondido, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 557–58 (Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 503 U.S. 519; Heyert 
v. Taddese, 70 A.3d 680, 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 160. Ala. Code § 11-80-8.1 (2020); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-461.16; Ark. Code Ann. § 14-16-
601; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-12-301; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-148b (2020); Fla. Stat. § 125.0103; Ga. 
Code Ann. § 44-7-19; Idaho Code § 55-307; 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 825/5 (West 2020); Ind. 
Code § 32-31-1-20; Iowa Code § 331.304 (2020); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,120 (West 2020); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65.875 (West 2020); La. Stat. Ann. § 9:3258; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 
40P, § 4 (West 2020); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.411; Minn. Stat. § 471.9996 (2019); 
Miss. Code. Ann. § 21-17-5 (2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 441.043 (West 2020); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 42-14.1; N.D. Cent. Code § 47-16-02.1 (2020); Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 14-101.1 (2020); S.C. 
Code Ann. § 27-39-60 (West 2020); S.D. Codified Laws § 6-1-13 (2020); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 66-35-102; Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.902; Utah Code § 57-20-1 (2006); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 35.21.830; Wis. Stat. § 66.1015 (2020). 
 161. Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8.5; Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 250.007. 
 162. For a helpful national survey of such ordinances, see generally Emily Thaden & 
Ruoniu Wang, Inclusionary Housing in the United States: Prevalence, Impact, and Practices 
(Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP17ET1, 2017), https://www.lincolninst.edu/ 
sites/default/files/pubfiles/thaden_wp17et1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWL6-EFLT]. 
 163. See, e.g., 2910 Ga. Ave. LLC v. District of Columbia, 234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 294 
(D.D.C. 2017); Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 979 (Cal. 2015); 
Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 61–62 (Ct. App. 2001). Questions 
as to which takings standards apply to inclusionary housing programs and whether such 
programs violate those standards remain the subject of fierce debate within academic 
literature. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable 
Housing Mandates, in Evidence and Innovation in Housing Law and Policy 64, 66 (Lee 
Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017) (contending that inclusionary housing 
programs amount to compensable takings), with Audrey G. McFarlane & Randall K. 
Johnson, Cities, Inclusion and Exactions, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 2145, 2180–84 (2017) (asserting 
that inclusionary housing ordinances should survive challenges under both Penn Central and 
Nollan/Dolan). 
 164. Most recently, the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Cherk 
v. County of Marin, allowing to stand a California appellate court decision rejecting a claim 
that an inclusionary housing program amounted to an unconstitutional condition. See No. 
A153579, 2018 WL 6583442, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018). 
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from adopting mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances, regardless of 
the circumstances.165 
6. Precluding Environmental Protection. — By and large, environmental 
laws have survived takings challenges outside the incredibly rare instance 
in which a law deprives the claimant’s property of all economic value.166 A 
number of states, though, have precluded local governments from seeking 
to prevent environmental degradation via land-use regulation in the 
                                                                                                                           
 165. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-461.16; Fla. Stat. § 163.31771; Ind. Code § 36-1-24.2-1; 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-35-102(b); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.905; Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.1015(3). One state follows the same course, though only with respect to manufactured 
homes. See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-1604. In other states, legislation limits local discretion 
in designing voluntary inclusionary housing policies. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 
40B, §§ 20–23 (West 2020); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws 45-24-46.1 (2020). Inclusionary zoning 
ordinances also have been invalidated by courts as inconsistent with the states’ prohibitions 
on rent control. See, e.g., Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C. v. Town of Telluride, 976 P.2d 
303, 307 (Colo. App. 1998), aff’d, 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000); Apt. Ass’n of S. Cent. Wis., Inc. v. 
City of Madison, 722 N.W.2d 614, 625 (Wis. App. 2006). In other states, state legislation 
limits exclusionary zoning practices at the local level. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 65580–
65589.9 (2020); Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.005 to .850 (2019). 
 166. The Supreme Court recently concluded that a “reasonable land-use regulation[] 
enacted . . . to preserve the river and surrounding land” does not “work a taking” under the 
Penn Central framework. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1947–50 (2017). Lower court 
cases rejecting regulatory takings challenges to environmental regulations abound. See, e.g., 
Wyer v. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 747 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 2000) (denial of variance under sand 
dune laws); Neifert v. Dep’t of Env’t, 910 A.2d 1100, 1114 (Md. 2006) (denial of sewer 
service and wetland fill permits); Erb v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 676 A.2d 1017, 1027 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1996) (denial of permit for septic system); Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of 
Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1390 (N.J. 1992) (ordinance limiting quarry operations); Save 
the Pine Bush v. Albany, 530 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (environmental review 
of minimum preserve acreage); Milardo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt., 434 A.2d 266, 268 (R.I. 1981) 
(denial of permit for sewage system construction); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 530 
S.E.2d 628, 634–35 (S.C. 2000) (denial of permits to bulkhead and fill lots). 
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context of pesticides,167 factory farms,168 oil and gas operations,169 plastic 
bags,170 and, in one state, Styrofoam.171 
7. Limiting Land-Use Variances. — A final area of state reordering to 
note in this category of state statutes involves local discretion in applying 
the strict terms of zoning codes. No court has found a taking based on the 
nonenforcement of an existing regulation against a third party, and most 
courts that have addressed such claims have rejected them summarily.172 
Some state legislatures, however, have limited the circumstances in which 
local governments can grant waivers from generally applicable land-use 
controls and thus, the extent to which local governments can inject 
flexibility into their regulatory regimes.173 
                                                                                                                           
 167. See Ala. Code § 2-27-5.1 (2020); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 3-349; Ark. Code Ann. § 20-20-
266; Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 11501.1 (2020); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 35-10-112(3) (2020); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 22a-54 (2020); Del. Code tit. 3, § 1203 (2020); Fla. Stat. § 482.242; Ga. Code 
Ann. § 2-7-113.1 (2020); Idaho Code § 22-3426 (2020); 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 60/3 (West 
2020); Ind. Code § 15-16-5-71; Iowa Code § 206.34 (2020); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 2-2480 (West 
2020); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 217b.270 (West 2020); La. Stat. Ann. § 3:3224 (2020); Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 132b, § 1 (West 2020); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.8328 (West 2020); Minn. 
Stat. § 18b.02 (2019); Miss. Code Ann. § 69-23-9 (2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 281.005 (West 
2020); Mont. Code Ann. § 80-8-120 (West 2019); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-2625 (2012); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 430:49 (2020); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 76-4-9.1 (2020); N.Y. Env’t Conserv. Law § 33-
0303(1) (McKinney 2020); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-435 (2020); N.D. Cent. Code § 4.1-34-
06 (2020); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 921.02 (2020); Okla. Stat. tit. 2, § 3-84 (2019); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 634.057; 3 Pa. Stat. § 111.57 (West 2020); 23 R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-25-9 (2020); S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 46-13-30 (2020); S.D. Codified Laws § 39-1-17 (2020); Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-114; Tex. 
Agric. Code Ann. § 76.003 (2019); Va. Code § 3.2-3907 (2016); Wash. Rev. Code § 17.21.010 
(2020); W. Va. Code Ann. § 19-16a-2 (LexisNexis 2020); Wis. Stat. § 94.701; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-
7-352 (2020). 
 168. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 580.0365; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,137; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 413.072; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.538; 3 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 313 (2020); S.D. Codified 
Laws § 39-1-17; Township of Franklin v. Hollander, 769 A.2d 427 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
2001), aff’d, 796 A.2d 874, 878 (N.J. 2002). 
 169. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 119-55; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2019); Tex. Nat. 
Res. Code § 81.0523 (2019). 
 170. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 9-500.38, 11-269.16; Del. Code tit. 7, § 6099A (2020); Fla. 
Stat. § 403.7033; Idaho Code § 67-2340; Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8.6; Iowa Code § 331.301(6)(c); 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.592; Minn. Stat. § 471.9998; Miss. Code Ann. § 17-1-73; Mo. 
Ann. Stat. § 260.283; Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.0961 (2019); Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0419. 
 171. Fla. Stat. § 500.90. 
 172. See Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, supra note 61, at 161–64. 
 173. In some instances, these statutes operate to constrain local governments in the 
sense that they appear to have been adopted out of concern that variances otherwise would 
be granted too generously at the local level. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-70 (2020) 
(declaring that no variance may be granted “without a showing that such variance or other 
relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not 
substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance”). 
In others, though, these statutes may have been enacted to ensure that local governments 
do not adopt what in the state legislature’s mind is an unduly narrow definition of the 
contexts within which a variance is appropriate. See, e.g., Tex. Agric. Code Ann. § 201.133 
(authorizing “variance[s] from the land-use regulations that will: (1) relieve the great 
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D.  Property Owner Empowerments 
The statutes in this section do not directly restrict the exercise of local 
regulatory authority but instead have the same effect by empowering 
landowners to resist local authority in historic landmark designations, 
development approvals, and permitting. 
1. Historic Preservation. — Many local ordinances identify 
neighborhoods as composed of structures that are of architectural or 
other historic significance.174 Structures within these districts are subject 
to design guidelines that check construction activities to ensure that they 
do not unduly interfere with the neighborhood’s historic integrity.175 
Constitutional takings challenges to such broadly applicable historic 
district designations have found little success.176 
Local governments have had slightly more difficulty justifying 
impositions on owners of structures individually deemed historic 
landmarks given that such impositions are less likely to offer the reciprocal 
advantages experienced by property owners within historic districts.177 
Still, the imposition on the owner of landmarked property may not be 
particularly severe—the owner’s current use may continue (so only a 
potential opportunity is lost), limitations generally “apply only to the 
structure’s exterior,” and “the land and structure remain marketable.”178 
For these reasons, even many historic landmark designations have survived 
regulatory takings review.179 
                                                                                                                           
practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships; (2) not be contrary to the public interest; (3) 
observe the spirit of the land-use regulations; (4) secure the public health, safety, and 
welfare; and (5) do substantial justice”). In this sense, while a large bulk of the state statutes 
constraining or preempting local-government authority seem aligned with the perspective 
of those who advance a broader view of takings liability than the courts have offered, the 
former class of variance statutes serves as an illustration of state legislatures’ moving to 
prevent local governments from regulating property in a manner that is perhaps too friendly 
to conventional takings claimants. 
 174. See Christopher D. Bowers, Historic Preservation Law Concerning Private 
Property, 30 Urb. Law. 405, 407 (1998) (noting how “local governments in almost every 
state regulate historic properties”). 
 175. See Robert J. Sitkowski & Brian W. Ohm, Form-Based Land Development 
Regulations, 38 Urb. Law. 163, 170 (2006) (describing how many localities have tried to use 
a “design guidelines” regime to balance between discretion and prescription). 
 176. See J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation Laws 
After Penn Central, 15 Fordham Env’t L. Rev. 313, 332–34 (2004) (describing how statutory 
hardship exceptions have made such claims difficult to litigate). 
 177. See, e.g., Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 888 (D. Md. 1996) 
(finding a compensable taking where the city refused to issue a certificate of 
appropriateness to a monastery seeking to demolish one of its buildings even though it 
conceded that there was no economically viable plan to preserve the building). 
 178. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, supra note 61, at 161. 
 179. See, e.g., Van Horn v. Town of Castine, 167 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105–06 (D. Me. 2001); 
Casey v. Mayor of Rockville, 929 A.2d 74, 108 (Md. 2007); State ex rel. Powderly v. Erickson, 
285 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1979); United Artists’ Theater Cir., Inc. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 614 (Pa. 1993); Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Pa. Hist. & Museum 
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Despite all this, several states have enacted statutes requiring that local 
governments allow property owners to refuse designation of their 
properties as historic.180 Some statutes even mandate that local 
governments allow the removal of prior historic designations.181 
2. Permitting Delays. — The Supreme Court has sought to distinguish 
normal delays in the land-use permitting process, which do not implicate 
takings protections, from extraordinary delays that might.182 One state 
supreme court described takings liability as potentially appropriate only 
when the government’s silence on a permit application is “so unreasonable 
from a legal standpoint as to lead to the conclusion that it was taken for 
no purpose other than to delay the development project before it.”183 In 
many states, however, state legislation categorically provides for the 
automatic approval of subdivision and related development applications if 
the local regulatory authority does not act on that application within a 
defined period, regardless of the circumstances.184 
                                                                                                                           
Comm’n, 628 A.2d 498, 502 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); 2218 Bryan St., Ltd. v. City of Dallas, 
175 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Tex. App. 2005). 
 180. See, e.g., Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 211.0165 (2019) (requiring that local governments 
obtain the owner’s consent to landmark that owner’s property as one of historic significance). 
 181. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.772 (2019) (authorizing owners to refuse to consent 
to historic designations or to remove the imposition of such designations). 
 182. See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (limiting the holding that a temporary restriction may constitute 
a taking by stating that the court “do[es] not deal with the quite different question that 
would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning 
ordinances, variances, and the like”). 
 183. Landgate, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Cal. 1998); see also 
Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that, in the temporary 
takings context, “[a] combination of extraordinary delay and intimated bad faith, under the 
third prong of the Penn Central analysis, influence the character of the governmental 
action”); Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 87 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(explaining the relevance of the fact that the city’s action was not taken “solely to delay the 
proposed project”). 
 184. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 11-52-32 (2020) (“[T]he municipal planning commission 
shall approve or disapprove a plat within 30 days after the submission thereof to it; 
otherwise, the plat shall be deemed to have been approved . . . .”); Alaska Stat. § 29.40.110 
(2020) (providing sixty days for plat approvals); Cal. Gov’t Code § 65952 (2020) (providing 
180 days for “lead” agencies and ninety days for “responsible,” or nonlead, agencies for 
most “development project[]” approvals, but not for rezoning requests); Del. Code tit. 9, 
§ 4811 (2020) (providing forty-five days for plat approvals); 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-
12-8 (West 2020) (providing ninety days for preliminary plat approvals and sixty days for 
final plat approvals); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-752 (West 2020) (providing sixty days for 
subdivision plats); La. Stat. Ann. § 33:113 (West 2019) (providing sixty days for subdivision 
plats); Md. Code Ann., Land Use § 5-201 (West 2020) (providing thirty days for subdivision 
plats); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 81U (West 2020) (providing forty-five days for a health 
board decision on subdivision plats and, thereafter, 135 days for a planning commission 
decision); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 560.109 (West 2019) (providing forty-five days for 
preliminary plat approvals and sixty days for final plat approvals); Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2020) 
(providing sixty days for zoning and septic system decisions); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 89.420 (West 
2020) (providing sixty days for subdivision plats); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:27-6.7 (West 2020) 
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3. Mandatory Permit Approvals. — While there remains some 
uncertainty in this regard, takings jurisprudence seems to suggest that a 
proposed land-use permit condition that is not appropriately connected 
or proportional to the permitted development’s impacts is to be enjoined.185 
It is conceivable that a court could require the payment of compensation 
for the interim period during which such an unconstitutional condition was 
in force.186 But no court has asserted that a claimant who successfully 
challenges a land-use permit condition as unconstitutional is also entitled 
to issuance of an unconditional permit; instead, the decision has been left 
to local governments to determine whether to issue new conditional 
permits that survive the nexus and proportionality strictures.187 
In some states, however, legislation authorizes property owners to 
proceed with development while simultaneously seeking compensation  
via a challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional condition attached to  
                                                                                                                           
(requiring county approval for a site plan or development permit and specifying that towns 
must submit to the county planning board for review, and that the board has thirty days to 
report back before it is deemed to have approved the submission); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-20-7 
(West 2020) (providing thirty-five days for plat approvals); N.Y. Town Law § 276 (McKinney 
2020) (providing sixty-two days for preliminary plat approvals and sixty-two days for final 
plat approvals); N.D. Cent. Code § 40-48-21 (2020) (providing thirty days for subdivision 
plats); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 711.05 (2020) (providing thirty days for subdivision plats); 
Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 47-115 (2020) (providing thirty days for subdivision plats); 53 Pa. Stat. 
§ 10508 (West 2020) (providing ninety days for subdivision plats); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-
23-37 (2020) (providing fifteen days for administrative review of a subdivision application 
and, thereafter, sixty-five days for a planning board decision); S.D. Codified Laws § 11-2-24.1 
(2020) (providing sixty-five days for subdivision plats); Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-4-304 (2020) 
(providing sixty days for plats); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 212.009 (providing thirty days for 
plat approvals); Wis. Stat. § 236.11 (2020) (providing ninety days for preliminary plat 
approvals and sixty days for final plat approvals); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-307 (2020) 
(providing forty-five days following the due date for the department of environmental 
quality’s review). Two commentators have queried whether the reality that automatic 
approval statutes eliminate the opportunity for neighbors to express opposition to the 
approval raises due process concerns. See Gregory G. Booker & Karen R. Cole, Automatic 
Approval Statutes: Escape Hatches and Pitfalls, 29 Urb. Law. 439, 470 (1997). 
 185. See Mulvaney, State of Exactions, supra note 153, at 211 (“Interestingly, 
the Koontz dissenters asserted that they agreed with the majority that a condition violative 
of Nollan and Dolan should be enjoined, even though the majority reached no such explicit 
conclusion.”). 
 186. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So. 3d 396, 398 n.2 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014) (“The fact that the government has the ‘greater authority’ to deny a permit 
does not imply the ‘lesser power to condition permit approval on petitioner’s forfeiture of 
his constitutional rights.’” (quoting Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 
595, 608 (2013))). 
 187. See Cheatham v. City of Hartselle, No. CV-14-J-397-NE, 2015 WL 897583, at *4–5 
(N.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2015); Levin v. City & County of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1088–
89 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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their development permits.188 In these jurisdictions, then, landowners can 
potentially both reap compensation and obtain an unconditioned permit. 
*    *    * 
Land uses are interdependent in the sense that they necessarily and 
directly—if at times only cumulatively—impact others’ land uses in both 
positive and negative ways. It is not possible, therefore, to protect the 
wishes or expectations of everyone with a plausible claim to a property 
interest in land.189 Government entities must make choices among 
conflicting property claims. These choices confer power on one party over 
others and, thereby, expose these others’ vulnerabilities.190 In theory, the 
government has a suite of regulatory tools at its disposal to execute choices 
among the competing interests at the heart of such conflicts. State 
legislatures have, however, preempted or constricted the local deployment 
of many tools tied to takings law, often without contextualized justification. 
State legislatures no doubt have general authority to adopt preemptive and 
constrictive measures.191 But that such authority exists is a separate issue 
from the ramifications of the sheer breadth of measures that have been 
adopted with little effort on the states’ part to justify them. 
When state legislatures preempt or constrict the deployment of 
regulatory tools that local governments rely on to balance competing 
property claims, the states are not merely shielding property owners from 
purportedly unfair burdens; they are also assuming responsibility for making 
choices among competing property claimants themselves. In assuming this 
                                                                                                                           
 188. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-20-204 (2020) (“An owner may proceed with 
development without prejudice to that owner’s right to pursue the remedy provided by this 
section.”). 
 189. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 13 (1928) 
(contending that “dominion over things” necessarily impedes the interests of other people); 
Eric T. Freyfogle, Taking Property Seriously, in 11 Property Rights and Sustainability: The 
Evolution of Property Rights to Meet Ecological Challenges 43, 50 (David Grinlinton & Prue 
Taylor eds., 2011) (asserting that property is an evolving social institution that involves the 
calibration and recalibration of private interests over time); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, 
Property: A Special Right, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1033, 1039 (1996) [hereinafter 
Underkuffler-Freund, A Special Right] (arguing that protecting a property interest for one 
person “necessarily and inevitably” denies that same interest to someone else). 
 190. See Marc R. Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, 12 J. Env’t L. & Litig. 43, 
44 (1997) (describing property as an “ongoing fight[] about who gets what, why, and how 
much”); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1991) 
(“The grant of a property right to one person leaves others vulnerable to the will of the 
owner. Conversely, the refusal to grant a property right leaves the claimant vulnerable to 
the will of others . . . .”); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 
9 Canadian J.L. & Juris. 161, 202–03 (1996) (“Property’s function, as a social and 
governmental institution, is the resolution of conflicting claims, visions, values, and 
histories. In this process, some individuals win, and others lose; the protection of some is, 
inevitably, sacrificed for the protection of others.”). 
 191. See Richard Briffault & Laurie Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local 
Government Law 432–93 (8th ed. 2016) (discussing state preemption authority). 
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responsibility, the states could very well utilize the tools they are preventing 
or constraining local governments from deploying. In select instances, 
states have done just that; for instance, some state legislatures have passed 
statutes declaring when neighboring lots must be merged.192 In most cases, 
though, states are deciding not to utilize these tools. 
These decisions are not neutral stances by state legislatures to protect 
from local interference a set of property interests that all naturally and 
concurrently enjoy.193 Rather, decisions mediating rivalrous rights to 
property necessarily set out the interests some have at the expense of the 
claimed interests of others.194 It follows that, through state legislatures’ use 
of—or, perhaps more often, choice not to use—the land-use regulatory 
tools that they are preventing local governments from deploying, states are 
deciding between competing alleged property rights. While conflicting 
property claims reflect the values that underlie both the conflicts and the 
solution to those conflicts, the takings-related state statutes described here 
resolve such conflicts in rigid, unmediated ways. 
This squarely raises normative and practical questions as to the 
respective roles that states and local governments should be playing in 
resolving the difficult tradeoffs inherent in the types of property disputes 
that are at the root of takings law—questions to which this Article now 
turns. 
III. TAKINGS LOCALISM 
Contemporary takings jurisprudence—as Part I explained—privileges 
the democratic resolution of conflicts between individual property rights 
and community imperatives. Although many of these conflicts involve 
local, not state, democracy, state legislatures—as Part II made clear—have 
shaped and limited local authority across a range of policy domains at the 
core of constitutional property. 
This Part accordingly turns to how best to understand this broad state 
reordering of local authority. To do so, this Part begins by situating 
                                                                                                                           
 192. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 394.36 (2019). 
 193. See Laura S. Underkuffler, When Should Rights “Trump?” An Examination of 
Speech and Property, 52 Me. L. Rev. 311, 316–17 (2000) (explaining that many constitu-
tional rights other than property—free speech, due process, free exercise, and the like—
can be considered public goods because consumption by one person generally does not 
detract from consumption by others and no one can be easily prevented from enjoying it). 
The claim that many constitutional rights other than property rights are appropriately 
considered public goods is not without reservation. For example, to the extent hate speech 
silences its targets, the government’s noninterference with one’s claim to free speech—for 
instance, a newspaper’s desire to publish hate speech—does interfere with another’s claim 
to the same. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of 
Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 127, 129–30 (1987). 
 194. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 75, 79–87 (2010) 
(describing, through a series of hypotheticals, how advancing one property interest comes 
at the expense of others). 
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property rights statutes in the context of the increasingly contentious 
landscape of contemporary conflicts over intergovernmental relations 
within the states, where states are increasingly constraining local power in 
almost every area of governance. Building on this connection, this Part 
then argues that the values inherent in takings jurisprudence would be 
best served by restoring an equilibrium between states and local 
governments that would foster intersystemic dialogue and promote a more 
contextual, nuanced approach to resolving the challenging tradeoffs 
inherent in takings law’s balance between individual rights and 
community imperatives. 
A.  The Disequilibrium of the New Preemption 
To begin, it is important to take a step back and situate the array of 
state statutes restructuring local authority in the property rights arena in 
the context of a rapidly changing landscape of contemporary state–local 
relations. In particular, scholars and popular commentators have raised 
concerns about the rise of a new form of state preemption that is increas-
ingly polarized in its valence, targeted in its focus, far-reaching in its sweep, 
and even outright punitive in its application.195 
Local-government legal authority is determined by a variety of state 
and federal doctrines that sound in constitutional structure, legislation, 
and even individual rights.196 Traditionally, at least since the middle of the 
nineteenth century, states were understood to exercise plenary authority 
over local governments.197 But waves of home-rule reform since Missouri 
                                                                                                                           
 195. See, e.g., Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response 
to Local Policy Innovation, 47 Publius: J. Federalism 403, 407–08 (2017) (surveying 
empirical trends in state preemption of “local fracking bans, minimum wage ordinances, 
sanctuary city policies, LGBT rights ordinances, and the rising use of ‘blanket 
preemption’”). Contemporary conflicts over state reordering of local authority have 
generated a significant body of literature in recent years. See supra note 17. 
 196. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 65, at 4, 111–12. Home rule generally refers 
to the legal authority of local governments independent of specific state delegation. See 
Briffault & Reynolds, supra note 191, at 349. By contrast, the regime of formal local legal 
powerlessness is generally known as “Dillon’s Rule,” in reference to former Iowa Supreme 
Court Justice and United States Circuit Judge John F. Dillon, who crystalized the conception 
of local governments as creatures of the state and a corresponding jurisprudence that 
requires specific legislative delegation, narrowly construed, for local governments to act. Id. 
at 327–30. 
 197. The classic statement of this plenary-authority view can be found in Hunter v. 
Pittsburgh, a case involving a challenge to the merger between the cities of Pittsburgh and 
Allegheny. 207 U.S. 161, 165–67 (1907). There, the Supreme Court stated that 
[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created 
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of 
the State as may be entrusted to them . . . . The number, nature and 
duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the 
territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion 
of the State . . . . The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or 
withdraw all such powers, . . . expand or contract the territorial area, unite 
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adopted the first home-rule constitutional amendment in 1875 
(empowering St. Louis to adopt the nation’s first municipal home-rule 
charter) have carved out important areas of local authority.198 State 
oversight of local governance is also constrained by federal and state indi-
vidual rights that impact the state–local relationship,199 as well as general 
limitations on state legislation, such as state constitutional “single subject” 
requirements and state constitutional bans on “special legislation.”200 
Within this framework, states have long played a constructive role policing 
particularly significant interlocal conflicts and setting baseline rules for 
policy areas of statewide concern.201 
                                                                                                                           
the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and 
destroy the corporation. All this may be done . . . with or without the 
consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. 
Id. at 178–79. 
 198. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2257, 2277–322 
(2003) (noting that participants in early home-rule reform movements thought that “to 
treat cities as mere creatures of the state with no independent responsibility” would “not 
suffice” and eventually carved out independent local powers). 
 199. For example, the Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot held that Black residents 
of Alabama had validly asserted claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
challenging the state’s redistricting of the City of Tuskegee. 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960). In 
the words of Justice Frankfurter, if the facts as alleged were true, the state redistricting 
legislation was “solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing 
Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.” Id. at 
341. In this context, then, the individual rights of disenfranchised residents posed a 
meaningful barrier to the supposedly plenary exercise of state authority over local 
government boundaries. For a more recent example of an individual-rights constraint on 
supposedly plenary state authority, the Supreme Court held that a state constitutional 
amendment that prohibited policies to protect against discrimination on the basis of 
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships” violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635 (1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b (1992)). 
 200. See Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: 
Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 
Harv. J. on Legis. 103, 124–51, app. I at 165–66 (2001) (surveying state constitutional 
legislative procedural constraints). Single-subject rules, as their name suggests, limit the 
substance of legislation (and popular democracy through initiatives and referenda) to 
related policy matters, so that legislators do not join disparate subjects for horse trading, 
legislative brinksmanship, or the kind of transparency challenges that can arise when a topic 
is hidden in a larger, unrelated bill. Bans on “special legislation” and “general laws” 
requirements, by contrast, operate as a quasi-equal protection generality constraint, 
imposing limitations on legislation that illegitimately singles out or irrationally impacts 
limited categories, including local governments. See generally Anthony Schutz, State 
Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as Structural Restraints, 40 J. Legis. 39 
(2013) (offering a structural, rather than an individual-rights, rationale to explain state 
special-legislation provisions). 
 201. This Article returns, in section III.B, to the question of whether “property rights” 
as such—beyond the baseline level of protection set by takings jurisprudence—should be 
considered a valid statewide interest sufficient to displace local authority in areas such as 
land use and the environment. 
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In recent years, however, the balance between local decisionmaking 
and state intervention has fallen into disequilibrium in many areas of 
policy.202 States, for example, have barred or limited local employee-benefits 
laws, such as minimum wage, fair scheduling, and paid sick leave;203 sought 
to limit local immigration approaches often labeled as “sanctuary”;204 
preempted local antidiscrimination protections;205 and taken aim at local 
housing policies that seek to advance equity and integration, including 
rent regulations and local source-of-income antidiscrimination ordinances.206 
State preemption has been similarly widespread in traditional areas of 
local concern, such as public health,207 as well as emerging areas of local 
innovation, such as fracking,208 municipal broadband,209 and the sharing 
                                                                                                                           
 202. These conflicts have been fueled by the ascendancy of coalitions of interest groups 
in many state legislatures that are generally hostile to regulation and people working to 
advance social-conservative policies, converging on a strain of anti-localism that bridges both 
perspectives in opposition to the relatively more progressive regulatory leanings of cities. 
See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 964. 
 203. Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption, supra note 17, at 1999. 
 204. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rick Su & Rose Cuison Villazor, Anti-Sanctuary and 
Immigration Localism, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 837, 839 (2019) (“[Texas’s anti-sanctuary law] 
limits endorsement of sanctuary policies, cuts down on the discretion of local agencies to 
disentangle themselves from federal enforcement, and creates civil and criminal liability for 
officials who maintain certain types of noncooperation policies on aiding federal immigration 
enforcement.”). 
 205. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 964–65 (describing how 
North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee preempted local antidiscrimination laws, 
including a local ordinance enacted to protect against LGBT discrimination); Schragger, 
The Attack on American Cities, supra note 17, at 1178 n.81, 1183, 1223–25 (noting how 
certain states, such as North Carolina and Colorado, sought to preempt local LGBT-
protective antidiscrimination laws). 
 206. See Nat’l League of Cities, Homeward Bound: The Road to Affordable Housing 45, 59 
app. B (2019), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/nlc-Homeward-Bound_The-
Road-to-Affordable-Housing_WEB-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7BN-E6D6] (“[V]arious state 
preemption of local authority over land use and protected classes has created an uneven 
and inequitable marketplace of housing across the country.”). Local rent-regulatory regimes 
have generated takings cases, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), marking 
yet another policy domain where states have overridden the authority that the Supreme 
Court has validated for local governments in takings law, see infra section II.C.5. 
 207. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 966–67 (noting that in the 
area of public health, various states have preempted local regulation in tobacco products, 
e-cigarettes and other alternative tobacco products, and nutrition and food policies). 
 208. See Sarah Fox, Home Rule in an Era of Local Environmental Innovation, 44 
Ecology L.Q. 575, 596 (2017) (contrasting the differing approaches of states like West 
Virginia, Colorado, New York, and Pennsylvania with respect to implied preemption of local 
limits on fracking). 
 209. See Nat’l League of Cities, City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A State-by-State 
Analysis 3–4, 17–19 (2018), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/NLC-SML-
Preemption-Report-2017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD6R-QXR] (“State preemption of 
municipal broadband generally falls into two categories: either explicitly prohibiting a 
public entity from providing broadband, or . . . placing sufficient barriers before local 
governments attempt to pursue municipal broadband.”). 
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economy.210 And, crucially, this state reordering of local authority often 
plucks at policy areas big and small without any analogous state regulatory 
regime, leaving regulatory voids on issues pressing to local governments.211 
State–local conflicts no longer reflect simply competing understand-
ings about which specific policy questions are more readily addressed at 
the state or local level. Instead, these conflicts are becoming weaponized 
and increasingly partisan.212 Arizona, for example, now uses its power over 
state revenue-share funding to force local governments to repeal local laws 
that the state deems preempted, setting litigation barriers to deter local 
governments from challenging such determinations.213 And states are now 
seeking to penalize individual local officials—threatening to fine and 
remove them from office if they take actions in areas that the states 
consider preempted. In 2003, Oklahoma enacted a law that created 
individual civil liability for officials who vote for laws that conflict with the 
state’s firearm preemption statute, a practice that has since proliferated.214 
                                                                                                                           
 210. Id. at 3–4, 12–16 (examining how state legislatures have preempted local laws in 
ride-hailing and home-sharing platforms). 
 211. The phenomenon of what one scholar has called “null preemption”—eliminating 
authority without a corresponding higher-level regulatory regime to replace it—has not 
traditionally been a feature of state preemption conflicts, though it has become a significant 
element of the new preemption. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1015 (2010) (describing null preemption and its lack of normative 
justifications). Some of the new preemption involves state legislation that sweeps away areas 
of local authority in their entirety. Michigan, for example, passed a statute that the press has 
dubbed the “Death Star bill”—H.B. 4052, the Local Government Labor Regulatory 
Limitation Act. See Emily Lawler, Gov. Rick Snyder Signs ‘Death Star’ Bill Prohibiting Local 
Wage, Benefits Ordinances, MLive (June 30, 2015), https://www.mlive.com/lansing-
news/2015/06/gov_rick_snyder_signs_death_st.html [https://perma.cc/A226-HNRE]. The 
act preempted local governments from “adopting, enforcing or administering local laws or 
policies concerning employee background checks, minimum wage, fringe benefits, paid or 
unpaid leave, work stoppages, fair scheduling, apprenticeships, or remedies for workplace 
disputes”—essentially the entire range of employee protections in one sweeping bill. 
Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption, supra note 17, at 2000. 
 212. See Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption, supra note 17, at 1997 (“The rise of 
the new preemption is closely connected to the interacting polarizations of Republican and 
Democrat, conservative and liberal, and nonurban and urban.”); Scharff, supra note 17, at 
1479 (stating that preemption battles often happen when interest groups lose a fight on the 
local level and use intrastate preemption as a weapon to oppose local policies they dislike); 
Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, supra note 17, at 1232 (“To be sure, the state–
city split reflects a Democratic/Republican split—and the fact that the ideological distance 
between the parties is significant and growing”). 
 213. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-194.01 (2020); see also State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 
399 P.3d 663, 671–72 (Ariz. 2017) (upholding portions of the statute). For discussion of 
Brnovich and its significance, see Scharff, supra note 17, at 1510–15. 
 214. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.24(D) (2019) (“When a person’s rights pursuant to the 
protection of the preemption provisions of this section have been violated, the person shall 
have the right to bring a civil action against the persons, municipality, and political 
subdivision jointly and severally for injunctive relief or monetary damages or both.”); see 
also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3108 (I)–(K) (private right of action for personal sanctions 
against local officials, including termination, removal, and civil penalties); Miss. Code Ann. 
§ 45-9-53(5)(a), (c) (2020) (private right of action and creating civil liability for local elected 
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And more than one state now even subjects local officials to potential 
criminal penalties for testing the boundaries of preemption.215 
This new targeted and punitive preemption, which reflects long-
standing but growing anti-urban hostility in many states,216 has highlighted 
contemporary democratic challenges at the state level. Most prominent 
among them, as Professor Paul Diller has argued, are state legislative 
gerrymandering efforts that have left the composition of many state 
legislatures starkly unrepresentative of the actual partisan composition of 
their states.217 But state preemptive legislation also reflects breakdowns in 
our modern system of campaign finance, as well as the rise of interest 
groups able to promulgate model legislation from state to state.218 
Political-process failures occur at the local level, as well—if not 
gerrymandering at the scale of the states, then certainly low participation, 
local interest-group capture, and the like that provide reminders to avoid 
overly valorizing local democracy.219 But in the contemporary landscape of 
state–local relations, it is striking the extent to which assumptions about 
the Madisonian argument for broader-scale politics is being tested. 
Indeed, the “new preemption” has led to calls for reforming contem-
porary state–local legal relations to modernize home rule to better protect 
local democracy from unreasonable state interference.220 The details of 
                                                                                                                           
officials up to $1,000, plus attorney’s fees and costs). State courts struck down similar 
provisions of a Florida statute. See City of Weston v. DeSantis, No. 2018 CA 0699, 2019 WL 
4806195, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2019) (striking down the punitive preemption 
provisions, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.33(3)–(4) (2019), on grounds of legislative immunity, gov-
ernmental function immunity, state contract clause, and state constitutional limitations on 
removal); Marcus v. Scott, No. 2012-CA-001260, 2014 WL 3797314, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 
2, 2014) (holding Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.33(3)(e) unconstitutional). 
 215. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65.870(4) (West 2020); S.B. 4, 85th Leg. § 5.02 (Tex. 2017). 
 216. See Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, supra note 17, at 1166 (“Even so, 
one might be surprised that the old rural–urban political dynamic that characterized early-
twentieth-century hostility to cities has reasserted itself in the beginning of the twenty-first 
century.”). 
 217. See Paul A. Diller, The Political Process of Preemption, 54 U. Rich. L. Rev. 343, 
370–71 (2020) (explaining how gerrymandering in Michigan, for example, has led to “[t]he 
skewing of the Michigan legislature away from statewide voter preferences”). 
 218. Id. at 362–63. 
 219. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 24, at 3–5 (listing some of the problems of local 
government, such as a lack of representation, low participation in local elections, and interest 
group capture). 
 220. The National League of Cities (NLC), an organization representing roughly 19,000 
local governments, recently published a document with a new comprehensive approach to 
home rule, including a model constitutional article that states could adopt in whole or in 
part. See Richard Briffault, Nestor M. Davidson, Paul A. Diller, Sarah Fox, Laurie Reynolds, 
Erin A. Scharff, Richard Schragger & Rick Su, Nat’l League of Cities, Principles of Home 
Rule for the Twenty-First Century 8 (2020), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=3613&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/QMR9-LJDJ]. 
This recent publication returns NLC to a role that its predecessor, then known as the 
American Municipal Association, played in the last major wave of home-rule reform. 
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these proposed reform efforts are beyond the scope of this Article, but this 
renewed interest in home rule is notable for what it indicates about the 
salience of the current texture of state oversight. Regardless of the 
prospects for reform, it is clear that state–local relations have reached an 
inflection point. 
In this light, it is possible to understand the broad, long-standing, and 
ongoing project of state legislatures limiting local-government discretion 
on property issues at the core of takings law as both a precursor to and an 
example of new preemption. The overlap between the two phenomena is, 
to be sure, not complete. State property rights legislation, for example, 
resulted from a difficult-to-pinpoint combination of grassroots “property 
rights” movements, organized interest-group advocacy, and reactions to 
Supreme Court case law as too permissive. Much of the new preemption, 
by contrast, has involved more directly partisan conflicts between 
progressive cities and conservative state legislatures.221 
At bottom, though, there is a notable substantive confluence of long-
developing takings-related state statutes and the sweeping state inter-
ference with local governance that is generating debate and consternation 
today. Akin to the new preemption, state preemption of local authority on 
land-use issues at the center of takings law approaches the resolution of 
local conflicts in an overly rigid and unduly uniform manner, eliminating 
even the possibility that local governments can serve as valuable partners 
in responding to local conditions. 
B.  Recalibrating State–Local Relations in Takings 
Understanding that there are conceptual linkages—though not, of 
course, perfect symmetry—between the new preemption and state takings-
related legislation underscores what is problematic about the rigidity and 
undue uniformity of that legislation. This section builds on these linkages 
to argue not for a pro-localist approach to constitutional property per se 
but instead for a rebalancing of the state–local relationship toward a more 
nuanced, context-sensitive approach that resists the anti-localist bent of 
contemporary state statutory law on issues most often at the center of 
takings cases. 
There is much to commend in the potential inherent in local 
governance for the democratic decisionmaking that animates takings 
jurisprudence. It is always difficult to generalize about local governments 
                                                                                                                           
Jefferson B. Fordham, Am. Mun. Ass’n, Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal 
Home Rule 5 (1953). 
 221. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 963–64 (noting how 
“[f]ollowing the 2010 census, many state legislative districts were redistricted in ways that 
locked in partisan advantages”). 
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given the tremendous variety in their form, size, and authority.222 Still, 
some broad themes can fairly characterize what often distinguishes local 
governments from their state counterparts, particularly in the context at 
issue here. Local governments, for example, generally offer more 
meaningful opportunities for civic participation,223 can often respond 
more swiftly to pressing challenges,224 and hold the promise of innovation 
and experimentation,225 all in the shadow of a special sensitivity to costs 
given their comparatively limited ability to raise revenues.226 All of these 
markings of local democracy bear relevance to the types of issues that most 
often animate takings jurisprudence. 
The ability of the citizenry to participate in the workings of democracy 
in direct ways, to begin, can be stronger at the local level than at the state 
level. Local officials often work and reside near their constituents, 
naturally making them more accessible—particularly in those smaller 
municipalities—than state legislators who regularly deliberate in the 
confines of their state capitals.227 Civic engagement at the local level, Alexis 
de Tocqueville argued, has the ancillary benefit of putting democracy 
“within people’s reach,” ultimately strengthening more centralized levels 
of governance.228 
A second core set of arguments for localism that resonates for 
constitutional property centers on responsiveness and accountability. In 
their best light, local communities consist not of arbitrarily arranged 
individualists, but of groups of people who seek to develop and pursue 
shared goals.229 Local governance allows for distinct localities to adopt 
                                                                                                                           
 222. See, e.g., Scharff, supra note 17, at 1474–75 (noting that there are over 90,000 local 
governments, with a mix of general-purpose governments—such as counties, municipalities, 
and townships—and special purpose governments). 
 223. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 Urb. Law. 253, 
258 (2004) [hereinafter Briffault, Home Rule] (“Democratic participation is more possible 
at the local level, where government bodies and public officials are more accessible and 
closer to home than they are at the state or national levels.”). 
 224. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer v. Evans as the Transformation of Local 
Government Law, 31 Urb. Law. 257, 274–75 (1999) (describing how local government is 
more responsive to “discrete communities” because minorities may be found in numbers 
“disproportionate to their representation in the statewide population” at the local level). 
 225. See Barron, supra note 198, at 2337 (describing the degree of local discretion over 
policy choices). 
 226. See, e.g., Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1680–85 (discussing the relative 
cost sensitivity of local governments); see also Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, 
Dues, and the “Get What You Pay for” Model of Local Government, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 373, 392 
(2004) (“[A] fairly large number of states have imposed stringent limits on 
their local governments’ ability to raise revenue.”). 
 227. See Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking 
Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 Temp. Pol. & C.R.L. Rev. 371, 373–74 (2008) (“It is 
far more likely that average citizens may interact with their city councilmember or mayor 
than their state legislator or governor.”). 
 228. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 62–63 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969). 
 229. Id. at 259. 
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different policies and approaches to advancing the diverse range of these 
goals via the provision of services and the promulgation of regulations.230 
This informational advantage of localism is reinforced by the immediacy 
of the ability of local governments to hold civic leadership accountable 
when governance diverges from local preferences. 
While by no means exhausting the valence of localism, a third 
argument for devolution that resonates for constitutional property sounds 
in the value of policy experimentalism. Justice Brandeis famously spoke to 
the ability of a “single, courageous” state to serve as a “laboratory” to 
conduct “novel social and economic experiments.”231 Justice Brandeis’s 
logic naturally extends downward from the fifty states to the nation’s 3,000 
counties and 15,000 municipalities.232 These localities not only conduct 
policy experiments but also serve as testing grounds for the results, with 
the extent to which other localities import policies initiated elsewhere 
substantiating the value of those experiments.233 
Highlighting these traditionally beneficial features of local 
governance is not to deny the existence of long-avowed reasons for caution 
in devolving decisionmaking responsibility over property issues at the 
center of takings disputes. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison famously 
depicted local governments as of insufficient size and capacity to engage 
in the type of long-term democratic give-and-take necessary to reach 
shifting majorities at more centralized levels of government.234 On this 
view, there is special concern that a single interest group can transform 
into a solidified majoritarian faction at the local level, wielding its power 
to take what it pleases from opposing factions without needing to give 
                                                                                                                           
 230. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty 
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1373, 1413 (2006) (“Flowing from 
the creation of more responsive governments are the related benefits of . . . better 
government reflecting constituents’ diverse social values . . . .”). 
 231. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 232. See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 223, at 259. But see Kenneth Stahl, Home 
Rule and State Preemption of Local Land Use Control, Urb. Law. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 15), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3485872 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (suggesting that local policies rarely diverge in practice, at least with respect to basic 
land-use controls). 
 233. See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 223, at 259. Local experimentalism can also 
foster policy diffusion, generating grassroots movements that, however promising, might 
have difficulty advancing at the state level. Id. at 260. 
 234. The Federalist No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also, 
e.g., Carol Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from 
the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 74, 100 (1989) 
(“Everyone is . . . tediously aware of the Federalist argument that we need a large republic 
as a safeguard against faction.”); Michael J. Waggoner, Log-Rolling and Judicial Review, 52 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 33, 35 (1980) (explaining the process of trading votes so that minorities 
can become a majority on an issue). 
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much of anything in return.235 A tyrannical local majority also may have a 
propensity to generate external impacts, as the scale of local regulation 
creates parochial incentives for the local political system to impose 
externalities on other local governments.236 
In one sense, these reasons for caution on local authority might seem 
especially pertinent in the context of land-use regulation. Land is 
immobile, and thus, real property ownership may be even more vulnerable 
to expropriation than other interests held by persons in the minority 
because owners cannot as readily exit the jurisdiction.237 Moreover, the 
exercise of property interests in land—when compared to the exercise of 
most other interests—is especially likely to generate extra-local effects 
given land’s interconnectedness,238 particularly as the traditionally sharp 
geographic separation among localities has given way to metropolitan 
areas in which such separations are often undetectable.239 
While a locality’s ability to regulate land use seems critical to its ability 
to develop and police its character, such regulations present a magnified 
version of the same types of externality-generating impacts that the 
exercise of property rights in land can portend. As Professor Briffault has 
noted, “Local density controls, restrictions on lot size, restrictions on 
affordable housing, and exclusions of regionally necessary (albeit locally 
undesirable) facilities contribute to regional sprawl, traffic congestion, 
housing costs, infrastructure costs, loss of open space, and other 
environmental harms.”240 All of these concerns, explicitly or implicitly, 
undergird support for state-level authority vis-à-vis local authority. 
                                                                                                                           
 235. See generally Clint Bolick, Leviathan: The Growth of Local Government and the 
Erosion of Liberty (2004) (arguing that the exponential growth of local government 
threatens “grassroots tyranny”). 
 236. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, 
and Dynamism, 21 Va. Env’t L.J. 189, 223 (2002) (describing how local governments may 
have their own “parochial concerns, such as impacts on the local tax base, jobs, and 
economic development, as well as the local benefits of certain environmental amenities”). 
 237. See, e.g., Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 2, at 58–62 (“[T]he 
costs of eminent domain and regulatory takings mostly fall on immobile assets, and exit 
therefore cannot be used to avoid most of them.”); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Competition 
Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 854–67 
(1992) (noting how even “vigorous competition [among municipalities] provides virtually 
no protection against the municipal extraction of economic rents from landowners”). For 
a defense of exit in the land context, arguing that “the market for development suffers many 
frictions, but nevertheless may be sufficiently competitive to constrain local governments’ 
exactions practices, except in a few narrow circumstances,” see Vicki Been, “Exit” as a 
Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 
91 Colum. L. Rev. 473, 478 (1991). 
 238. See Sax, Private Property and Public Rights, supra note 41, at 155 (noting that “the 
ecological facts of life demonstrate a powerful inextricability in the utilization of natural 
resources”). 
 239. See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 223, at 262. 
 240. Id. at 261, 271; see also David A. Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain, 17 Sup. Ct. 
Econ. Rev. 7, 7–8 (2009) [hereinafter Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain] (exploring the 
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In another sense, however, traditional reasons for caution about local 
authority in property lose some force when seen in light of counter-
balancing concerns with state governance evident in the new preemption. 
Barriers to democracy at the state level stemming from gerrymandering 
and interest-group capture raise concerns in the property rights context 
no less than in other areas of new preemption.241 Moreover, there is a 
plausible argument that property-related interests at the local level are least 
likely to be in need of extraordinary state intervention to overcome local 
political-process failure. This is true whether they are overrepresented in 
Professor William Fischel’s paradigmatically home-voting suburban 
communities242 or because they represent the proverbial growth machines 
of denser urban political economies.243 Whatever risks the tyranny of the 
local majority holds as a general matter, in other words, property holders 
seem more likely to be the subjects than the objects of political power in 
most local contexts.244 
The adoption of local regulations that affect property interests should 
certainly reflect legitimate state concerns. States can play a meaningful 
                                                                                                                           
“phenomenon of ‘exclusionary eminent domain’—the exercise of eminent domain that has 
the effect of excluding low-income households from an otherwise predominantly or entirely 
middle-class or wealthy neighborhood or locality, whether or not exclusion itself was the 
purpose of the condemnation”). Professor Briffault asserts that state mandates on some 
subjects—such as policing business, promoting equality, or aiding the poor—“may at times 
be necessary” where local governments would adopt them but for interlocal competition. 
See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 223, at 268. Professor Richard Schragger suggests that 
the prospect of exit to other jurisdictions is limited today in the face of the agglomeration 
economies that characterize many cities. See Richard C. Schragger, Federalism, 
Metropolitanism, and the Problem of States, 105 Va. L. Rev. 1537, 1548–53 (2019). 
 241. See supra text accompanying notes 217–218. 
 242. See generally Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 15 (arguing that the 
political economy of suburban communities tends to be driven by interest groups focused 
on preserving the value of single-family housing). 
 243. See Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy 
of Place, 82 Am. J. Socio. 309, 309–10 (1976) (positing a theory that the desire for growth 
mobilizes and builds consensus among the urban elite); see also Vicki Been, Josiah Madar 
& Simon McDonnell, Urban Land Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth 
Machine?, 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 227, 259–61 (2014) (empirically testing the urban-
growth-machine and the homevoter models and finding “surprising support for the 
homevoter-based model”). 
 244. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 
41–44 (2008) (explaining the political economy of takings protection that favors owners 
with relatively greater assets). 
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role guiding,245 brokering,246 monitoring,247 and, where appropriate, 
intervening in local policies that have the greatest propensity to generate 
externalities or discriminatory impacts beyond a locality’s boundaries.248 It 
is difficult, however, to deny that state preemption in the property rights 
context is all too often rigid and acontextual, rather than reflecting how 
and in which situations the states might operate to improve the exercise of 
local power. 
For example, categorical state statutory compensation mandates249 
bleach all local texture from an inquiry that in constitutional adjudication 
recognizes challenging contextual tradeoffs among the degree of the 
concentration of harm, the reasonableness of the expectation of an owner 
in a given regulatory arena, and the nature of the governmental action at 
issue. Similarly, bans on all economic-development eminent domain 
valorize the worst potential breakdown of the exercise of local authority, 
and, in the process, eliminate a potentially positive local policy option 
regardless of the equities involved in any given instance.250 
It is conceivable that procedural requirements could improve local 
decisionmaking and protect vulnerable communities by clarifying the 
terms of policy decisions that often have implications—in terms of discrim-
inatory impacts, environmental degradation, and the like—beyond the 
property at issue. But state procedural statutes in the takings context, such 
as takings impact assessment requirements251 and state impact-fee 
                                                                                                                           
 245. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Land Use Law and Active Living: 
Opportunities for States to Assume a Leadership Role in Promoting and Incentivizing Local 
Options, 5 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 317, 358–59 (2008) (discussing ways in which state 
planning mandates can offer guidance to local governments). 
 246. See Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and 
the New Regionalism, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 93, 97–98, 158 (2003) (discussing the state role in 
facilitating regionalism); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal 
Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 190, 221 (2001) (explaining state facilitation of interlocal 
bargaining). 
 247. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use 
Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. Rev. 177, 263 (2006) (discussing 
state monitoring of, and data collection about, local policies). 
 248. See, e.g., Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain, supra note 240, at 28–31 
(discussing the need for state doctrine to temper exclusionary local policies). 
 249. See supra section II.A.1. 
 250. Many other instances of state preemption in the takings context similarly seem 
designed to remove broad areas of local authority to respond to the perception of local 
policy failure in particularly salient—even if not necessarily truly representative—examples. 
The widespread adoption of rent-control preemption, for example, reflects not just the 
political power of landlord interests at the state level, but also a lack of understanding of the 
modern evolution of rent regulation as much more carefully crafted than early generations 
of rent control. See generally Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Sophia House, Laboratories 
of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws, 46 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
1041 (2019) (describing the numerous choices jurisdictions make in designing and 
implementing modern-day rent regulation programs). 
 251. See supra section II.B. 
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statutes,252 generally serve not to enhance the quality of local decision-
making but instead to override it, thereby privileging the interests of 
owners in contexts in which the local political economy seems unfavorable 
to that interest group.253 
A more intersystemically nuanced approach could involve states 
helping local governments face the challenges of local governance—
managing interest-group pressures, increasing the capacity to understand 
and weigh extra-local impacts, and the like, all of which are often 
compounded by significant local fiscal constraints inherent in local 
decisionmaking around property issues—without dismissing local 
advantages in terms of civic participation, responsiveness, and experimen-
talism.254 The breadth of state efforts to limit local decisionmaking 
authority in land-use and related policy areas simply do not allow for this 
kind of contextualization, much like the bulk of recent new preemption 
measures that pointedly eliminate local power.255 Local governments can 
hardly be accountable—let alone responsive to distinctive local 
conditions—if critical areas of authority are materially constrained or 
removed in their entirety without justification. 
This is not to cede entirely the state role by any means. States must 
attend to particularly troubling local policies—for example, local 
exclusionary zoning that reinforces economic and racial segregation. But 
removing local authority wholesale through state preemption across a 
range of local land-use and related policy areas is rarely the most prudent 
course and may have unintended consequences.256 More targeted and 
subject-specific state (and federal) intervention, whether through robust 
                                                                                                                           
 252. See supra note 156 (noting, among many other examples, instances in which state 
impact-fee statutes clarify the relevant standards and procedures at issue). 
 253. See Richard C. Schragger, Local Control of Land Use: A Partial Defense 3–8 (Sept. 
2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Schragger, Local Control of Land 
Use] (unpublished working paper) (arguing that recent state-level market-favoring preemption 
of local land-use authority may harm lower-income and minority communities, while 
deregulating local housing markets can lead to higher costs and less control over development 
and displacement). 
 254. See Barron, supra note 198, at 2264 (advocating for home-rule reform that does 
not “strictly limit local powers to a narrow sphere” but rather “alter[s] the current mix of 
state law grants and limits that gives substance to local legal power”). See generally John R. 
Nolon, Calming Troubled Waters: Local Solutions, 44 Vt. L. Rev. 1 (2019) (describing 
examples of how states can provide critical information and support for local governments); 
Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 177 (2018) (illustrating the 
successes of cooperative “subfederalism” through Oregon, Florida, and California 
regulations). 
 255. See supra section III.A. 
 256. See Schragger, Local Control of Land Use, supra note 253, at 3–6 (discussing state 
deregulation of local land use as tending to favor market-oriented solutions to problems 
such as affordable housing that may undermine the nominal goals of such deregulation but 
arguing that state preemption of local authority is not a viable solution). 
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fair housing laws or related approaches, are generally preferable to unduly 
uniform state constraints.257 
When seen in full, then, the contemporary landscape of broad, overly 
rigid state takings preemption undermines the positive role that local 
governance can play in constitutional property without many of the off-
setting benefits of a cooperative state–local approach. Ultimately, then, a 
more localist-sensitive takings federalism—a takings localism—could 
productively rebalance the state–local relationship away from an anti-
localism that has for too long unduly problematized property governance. 
C.  Localism and Takings Theory 
Rebalancing state intervention to protect space for local authority and 
input, with appropriate caution, lends normative strength to a juris-
prudence of the Takings Clause that seeks to maintain property’s 
character as a healthy democratic institution.258 A more localist-sensitive 
equilibrium, however, also illuminates long-standing debates in academic 
discourse. Although the richness of the literature on takings theory does 
not allow for a full accounting here, it is sufficient to note critical ways in 
which a new takings localism would resonate both for takings theories that 
give primacy to efficiency and those more oriented toward fairness and 
distributional justice. 
Many efficiency-based theories of takings rest on the implicit premise 
that human values and ends are generally subjective.259 On this view, the 
legislative process serves to maximize the satisfaction of these subjective 
values and ends, acting like a market where votes and political advantage 
serve as currencies of exchange.260 Regulatory choices are understood in 
turn as the product of bargains struck among diverse, individually derived 
preferences, with majoritarianism theoretically lowering the transaction 
costs of reaching that bargain.261 Constitutionally mandated 
compensation, in this view, helps ensure that majorities take account of 
                                                                                                                           
 257. Cf. Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 990–96 (exploring state 
general welfare constraints on exclusionary local authority). 
 258. See supra section I.A. 
 259. See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: 
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. L.J. 145, 152 (1977) 
[hereinafter Michelman, Political Markets] (describing a “strictly individualist and 
subjectivist conception of human experience” that “serves as a foundation for modern 
economic analysis”). 
 260. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical 
Introduction ch.3 (1991) (providing an overview of an economic theory of legislation). 
 261. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 100–03 (1962) (explaining how during 
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the costs—not merely the perceived benefits—of regulation, or that 
regulation counteracts market or procedural failures.262 
Understanding the intersection of localism and takings theory adds 
depth to this public-choice perspective by elevating distinctions among 
government entities of different sizes and strengths within the states.263 To 
begin, there is a strong argument that, to the extent the incentive structure 
of the so-called “fiscal illusion” theory has any grounding in actual 
practice, it is at the local level.264 Local governments tend paradigmatically 
to be more sensitive to compensation mandates given their scale and the 
fiscal constraints under which they operate, and, if anything, may be too 
cautious in exercising their regulatory authority in that light.265 If states are 
making the relevant tradeoffs, and they are comparatively more indifferent 
to cost, they are more apt to miscalculate the balance between individual 
rights and community needs in any particular circumstance.266 As with 
other individual rights, that may—depending on one’s perspective—be a 
feature, not a bug, but the point emphasized here is that it is important to 
recognize that broader scales of reference change the calculus. 
Moreover, to the extent that efficiency-based theories of takings 
highlight the advantages of mobility—exit and entrance—to maximize the 
satisfaction of individual preferences, there is an argument that local 
authority can leverage individual market signals, given that much mobility 
takes place within, rather than among, the states.267 It is true that the 
immobility of real property makes mobility-based arguments in takings 
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more vulnerable than in some areas of governance,268 but that does not 
mean the feedback loop of local preference shaping and accountability 
fails entirely for property. The critical point is a marginal one. To the 
extent that local governments respond to mobility-related incentives in 
areas of policy most related to takings, centralizing through broad-scale 
state preemption undermines that avenue of preference satisfaction. This 
is not to endorse the perspective wholesale, but instead to highlight the 
interplay between devolutionary arguments in the discourse of localism 
and their potential implications for takings. 
Questions of the balance of authority between states and local 
governments are no less relevant to evaluating fairness and distributional 
justice in takings. As noted, both the Supreme Court and commentators 
have highlighted the role of compensation in restoring parity to owners 
whose property has been undermined in a manner that would be unjust 
absent that payment.269 This perspective foregrounds substantive outcomes 
rather than market or procedural failures. While fairness theories in takings 
diverge on their assessment of when owners should be considered 
sufficiently singled out by a regulation to warrant compensation, they tend 
to moderate compensation mandates through a recognition of the long-
run reciprocity inherent in property.270 
Fairness theories of takings are often justified by the proposition that 
because property law involves the resolution of competing claims to 
nonshareable resources, governmental decisions to allocate property 
interests will always require that someone’s interest be sacrificed one way 
or another.271 Even if a sacrifice is especially stark and unexpected for a 
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given individual in a given instance, the thinking goes, that sacrifice is 
likely to be offset in the long run by living in a civilized society that subjects 
owners, over time, to an interconnected system of both sacrifices in service 
of other members of the community and advantages gained at those same 
persons’ expense.272 From this, it follows that legislators tasked with 
resolving competing property claims—allocating those sacrifices and 
advantages—deserve deference when guided by other-regarding 
principles in identifying, defining, persuading, and taking actions toward 
objectively defined human values and ends through joint, reasoned 
deliberation.273 
Fairness-based accounts of takings law, as with efficiency, can be 
illuminated through the lens of the state and local allocation of decisional 
authority with respect to the sacrifices and advantages inherent in 
property.274 Fairness-oriented theories of takings require contextualized 
decisionmaking, given that the normative evaluation of singling out 
involves a detailed look into whether and why parties should be considered 
similarly situated. In this light, there is much to be concerned about when 
a sole decisionmaker—the state government—is making those decisions 
through rigid dictates that sweep broadly rather than resting those 
decisions on contextualized justifications. 
This is not to contend, of course, that fairness-based accounts should 
necessarily embrace localism in all elements. Rather, it is to suggest that 
attending to the character of the specific level of government that makes 
the allocative decision at the center of a takings case could deepen the 
analysis required to determine whether a specific regulation has isolated a 
particular individual in such a way that only compensation can avert 
manifest injustice. Adding localism to this analysis highlights the relative 
capacity to target and respond to on-the-ground impacts, offer impacted 
parties meaningful opportunities to participate, and confront fundamental 
ills such as exclusion and inequality. As with the blunt tool of preemption 
and similar state constraints in efficiency accounts, so too with fairness-
based theories there can be much to commend an equilibrium that 
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preserves space for the local in an intersystemic dialogue that fosters 
nuance and regard for the challenging tradeoffs inherent in constitutional 
property. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with the premise that the Takings Clause provides 
protection against changes to a legal right—property—that states have 
traditionally defined. This means that takings law is inherently federalist 
in structure, placing great weight on the democratic process within the 
states to resolve many of the most contentious constitutional property 
questions. But takings federalism does not stop devolving at the state level, 
given the centrality of local governments to property. Given that, it makes 
sense—echoing Professor Heather Gerken—to carry the democratic 
vision at the heart of takings jurisprudence all the way down.275 
Takings jurisprudence provides space for democratic institutions, 
from the councils of the smallest rural villages to the legislatures of the 
most populous states. State legislatures, however, have unjustifiably 
arrogated and centralized authority over property issues in a marked way 
by preempting and otherwise constricting local powers to resolve issues 
that have served as key touchpoints in the development of takings law. The 
extent of this state interference when laid out in a cumulative way has been 
underappreciated in the literature and raises significant concerns. 
Resolving takings conflicts through overly rigid, unmediated 
statewide standards echoes the arguments that scholars have made against 
the current state excesses of the new preemption. Strengthening local 
authority in the property arena certainly carries normative and practical 
concerns—albeit concerns that may be better resolved through narrowly 
targeted interventions rather than sweeping constraints on local authority. 
But rebalancing to preserve local authority over property is true to the 
democratic underpinnings of takings jurisprudence and is a more 
attractive way of instantiating the decentralizing instincts underlying the 
doctrine. States have a role to play, as do the courts, in setting the outer 
boundaries of constitutional property. But local governments should not 
lightly be discarded as a locus for contributing meaningfully to the 
democratic tradeoffs inherent in conflicts over property. The time has 
arrived, in short, for takings localism. 
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